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Message-ID: <YE53QiJuxsCUeoiu@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2021 23:51:14 +0300
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, gorcunov@...nvz.org,
security@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH] prctl: fix PR_SET_MM_AUXV kernel stack leak
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_AUXV, addr, 1);
will copy 1 byte from userspace to (quite big) on-stack array
and then stash everything to mm->saved_auxv.
AT_NULL terminator will be inserted at the very end.
/proc/*/auxv handler will find that AT_NULL terminator
and copy original stack contents to userspace.
This devious scheme requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
---
apply to >=3.5
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2079,7 +2079,7 @@ static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
* up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace
* tools which use this vector might be unhappy.
*/
- unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE];
+ unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE] = {};
if (len > sizeof(user_auxv))
return -EINVAL;
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