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Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 17:03:47 +0800
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, pbonzini@...hat.com,
vkuznets@...hat.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] KVM: nVMX: Sync L2 guest CET states between L1/L2
On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 09:45:11AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 15, 2021, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > These fields are rarely updated by L1 QEMU/KVM, sync them when L1 is trying to
> > read/write them and after they're changed. If CET guest entry-load bit is not
> > set by L1 guest, migrate them to L2 manaully.
> >
> > Opportunistically remove one blank line and add minor fix for MPX.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 1 -
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 3 +++
> > 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > index d191de769093..8692f53b8cd0 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > @@ -143,7 +143,6 @@ void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > }
> > vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss =
> > (((u64)best->edx << 32) | best->ecx) & supported_xss;
> > -
>
> Spurious whitespace deletion.
Yes, Opportunistically did it as said in commit log :-D
>
> > } else {
> > vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss = 0;
> > }
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > index 9728efd529a1..57ecd8225568 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> > @@ -2516,6 +2516,13 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
> > vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
> >
> > set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
> > +
> > + if (kvm_cet_supported() && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
> > + (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, vmcs12->guest_ssp);
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, vmcs12->guest_s_cet);
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl);
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -2556,6 +2563,15 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
> > if (kvm_mpx_supported() && (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
> > !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)))
> > vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_bndcfgs);
> > +
> > + if (kvm_cet_supported() && (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
> > + !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE))) {
>
> Not your code per se, since this pattern comes from BNDCFGS and DEBUGCTL, but I
> don't see how loading vmcs01 state in this combo is correct:
>
> a. kvm_xxx_supported() == 1
> b. nested_run_pending == false
> c. vm_entry_controls.load_xxx_state == true
>
> nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode() only snapshots vmcs01 if
> vm_entry_controls.load_xxx_state == false, which means the above combo is
> loading stale values (or more likely, zeros).
>
> I _think_ nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode() just needs to snapshot vmcs01 if
> nested_run_pending=false. For migration, if userspace restores MSRs after
> KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, then what's done here is likely irrelevant. If userspace
> restores MSRs before nested state, then vmcs01 will hold the desired value since
> setting MSRs would have written the value into vmcs01.
Then the code nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode() would look like:
if (kvm_cet_supported() && !vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
...
}
I have another concern now, if vm_entry_controls.load_cet_state == false, and L1
updated vmcs fields, so the latest states are in vmcs12, but they cannot
be synced to vmcs02 because in prepare_vmcs02_rare():
if (kvm_cet_supported() && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
...
}
so L2 got stale status. IMO, L1 guest sets vm_entry_controls.load_cet_state == false
should be rare case. We event can igore this case :-)
>
> I suspect no one has reported this issue because guests simply don't use MPX,
> and up until the recent LBR stuff, KVM effectively zeroed out DEBUGCTL for the
> guest.
>
So for MPX and DEBUGCTL, is it worth some separate fix patch?
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index 45622e9c4449..4184ff601120 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -3298,10 +3298,11 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> if (likely(!evaluate_pending_interrupts) && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
> evaluate_pending_interrupts |= vmx_has_apicv_interrupt(vcpu);
>
> - if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS))
> + if (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
> + !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS))
> vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
> - if (kvm_mpx_supported() &&
> - !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
> + if (kvm_mpx_supported() && (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
> + !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)))
> vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_bndcfgs = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
>
> /*
>
>
> Side topic, all of this code is broken for SMM emulation. SMI+RSM don't do a
> full VM-Exit -> VM-Entry; the CPU forcefully exits non-root, but most state that
> is loaded from the VMCS is left untouched. It's the SMI handler's responsibility
> to not enable features, e.g. to not set CR4.CET. For sane use cases, this
> probably doesn't matter as vmcs12 will be configured to context switch state,
> but if L1 is doing anything out of the ordinary, SMI+RSM will corrupt state.
>
> E.g. if L1 enables MPX in the guest, does not intercept L2 writes to BNDCFGS,
> and does not load BNDCFGS on VM-Entry, then SMI+RSM would corrupt BNDCFGS since
> the SMI "exit" would clear BNDCFGS, and the RSM "entry" would load zero. This
> is 100% contrived, and probably doesn't impact real world use cases, but it
> still bugs me :-)
Exactly, should it be fixed by separate patch or leave it as is?
>
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_ssp);
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_s_cet);
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE,
> > + vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_ssp_tbl);
> > + }
> > +
> > vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_rflags);
> >
> > /* EXCEPTION_BITMAP and CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK should basically be the
> > @@ -3373,8 +3389,14 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS))
> > vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
> > if (kvm_mpx_supported() &&
> > - !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
> > + !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
> > vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_bndcfgs = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
> > + if (kvm_cet_supported() &&
> > + !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
> > + vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_ssp = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
> > + vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_s_cet = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
> > + vmx->nested.vmcs01_guest_ssp_tbl = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
> > + }
> >
> > /*
> > * Overwrite vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 with L1's CR3 if EPT is disabled *and*
> > @@ -4001,6 +4023,9 @@ static bool is_vmcs12_ext_field(unsigned long field)
> > case GUEST_IDTR_BASE:
> > case GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS:
> > case GUEST_BNDCFGS:
> > + case GUEST_SSP:
> > + case GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE:
> > + case GUEST_S_CET:
> > return true;
> > default:
> > break;
> > @@ -4050,8 +4075,14 @@ static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > vmcs12->guest_idtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
> > vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
> > vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS);
> > - if (kvm_mpx_supported())
> > + if (kvm_mpx_supported() && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX))
>
> Adding the CPUID check for MPX definitely needs to be a separate commit.
Sure, will fix them by separate patch. Thanks for review!
>
> > vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
> > + if (kvm_cet_supported() && (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> > + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))) {
> > + vmcs12->guest_ssp = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
> > + vmcs12->guest_s_cet = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
> > + vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
> > + }
> >
> > vmx->nested.need_sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare = false;
> > }
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> > index 9d3a557949ac..36dc4fdb0909 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> > @@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ struct nested_vmx {
> > /* to migrate it to L2 if VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS is off */
> > u64 vmcs01_debugctl;
> > u64 vmcs01_guest_bndcfgs;
> > + u64 vmcs01_guest_ssp;
> > + u64 vmcs01_guest_s_cet;
> > + u64 vmcs01_guest_ssp_tbl;
> >
> > /* to migrate it to L1 if L2 writes to L1's CR8 directly */
> > int l1_tpr_threshold;
> > --
> > 2.26.2
> >
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