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Message-ID: <0d0adfa1-b5c3-8fd6-82f6-2a9c4de2b3f0@pengutronix.de>
Date:   Wed, 17 Mar 2021 14:58:44 +0100
From:   Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc:     Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, kernel@...gutronix.de,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

Hello Jarkko,

On 16.03.21 20:22, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 06:01:18PM +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
>> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
>> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>>
>> The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and
>> has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
>>
>> This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
>> Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing
>> time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
>> encryption/decryption of user data.
>>
>> This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
>>
>> Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends
>> and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these,
>> provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>

> Too early to ack, as I've not included the TEE thing to any PR yet.

No problem. I'd be happy to incorporate the feedback I receive in the meantime.

Cheers,
Ahmad

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