linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 25/25] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute

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Date:   Fri, 19 Mar 2021 20:24:43 +1300
From:   Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, seanjc@...gle.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...el.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
        haitao.huang@...el.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
        tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
        jmattson@...gle.com, joro@...tes.org, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        wanpengli@...cent.com, corbet@....net,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 25/25] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>

Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace
to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a
file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.

The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.

To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
default.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c             | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h       |  1 +
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 38e327d4b479..ebb47e48d4f3 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -6230,6 +6230,29 @@ KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them.
 This capability can be used to check / enable 2nd DAWR feature provided
 by POWER10 processor.
 
+7.24 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested
+          attribute is not supported by KVM.
+
+KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or
+more priveleged enclave attributes.  args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid
+SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted
+by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY).
+
+The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide
+additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY
+is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable
+system fingerprint.  To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions
+by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by
+default.
+
+See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ======================
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index a0d45607b702..6dc12d949f86 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
 		 */
 		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
-			      /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
+			      SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
 			      SGX_ATTR_KSS;
 		entry->ebx &= 0;
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d2da5abcf395..81139e076380 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 #include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -3759,6 +3760,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
 	case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE:
+#endif
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
@@ -5345,6 +5349,23 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 			kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled = true;
 		r = 0;
 		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: {
+		unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0;
+
+		r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		/* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */
+		if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) &&
+		    !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY))
+			kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true;
+		else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index f6afee209620..7d8927e474f8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192
 #define KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT 193
 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194
+#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 195
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
-- 
2.30.2