linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V4 05/18] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and allocation APIs

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Message-ID: <20210319124645.GP2356281@nvidia.com>
Date:   Fri, 19 Mar 2021 09:46:45 -0300
From:   Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
To:     Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>
Cc:     Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>,
        Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.com>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        Eric Auger <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>, Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@...el.com>,
        Wu Hao <hao.wu@...el.com>, Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V4 05/18] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and
 allocation APIs

On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 10:58:41AM +0100, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote:

> Although there is no use for it at the moment (only two upstream users and
> it looks like amdkfd always uses current too), I quite like the
> client-server model where the privileged process does bind() and programs
> the hardware queue on behalf of the client process.

This creates a lot complexity, how do does process A get a secure
reference to B? How does it access the memory in B to setup the HW?

Why do we need separation anyhow? SVM devices are supposed to be
secure or they shouldn't do SVM.

Jason