linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V4 05/18] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and allocation APIs

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Message-ID: <YFhiMLR35WWMW/Hu@myrica>
Date:   Mon, 22 Mar 2021 10:24:00 +0100
From:   Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>
To:     Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>,
        Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.com>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        Eric Auger <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>, Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@...el.com>,
        Wu Hao <hao.wu@...el.com>, Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V4 05/18] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and
 allocation APIs

On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 11:22:21AM -0700, Jacob Pan wrote:
> Hi Jason,
> 
> On Fri, 19 Mar 2021 10:54:32 -0300, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 02:41:32PM +0100, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote:
> > > On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 09:46:45AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:  
> > > > On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 10:58:41AM +0100, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote:
> > > >   
> > > > > Although there is no use for it at the moment (only two upstream
> > > > > users and it looks like amdkfd always uses current too), I quite
> > > > > like the client-server model where the privileged process does
> > > > > bind() and programs the hardware queue on behalf of the client
> > > > > process.  
> > > > 
> > > > This creates a lot complexity, how do does process A get a secure
> > > > reference to B? How does it access the memory in B to setup the HW?  
> > > 
> > > mm_access() for example, and passing addresses via IPC  
> > 
> > I'd rather the source process establish its own PASID and then pass
> > the rights to use it to some other process via FD passing than try to
> > go the other way. There are lots of security questions with something
> > like mm_access.
> > 
> 
> Thank you all for the input, it sounds like we are OK to remove mm argument
> from iommu_sva_bind_device() and iommu_sva_alloc_pasid() for now?

Fine by me. By the way the IDXD currently missues the bind API for
supervisor PASID, and the drvdata parameter isn't otherwise used. This
would be a good occasion to clean both. The new bind prototype could be:

struct iommu_sva *iommu_sva_bind_device(struct device *dev, int flags)

And a flag IOMMU_SVA_BIND_SUPERVISOR (not that I plan to implement it in
the SMMU, but I think we need to clean the current usage)

> 
> Let me try to summarize PASID allocation as below:
> 
> Interfaces	| Usage	|  Limit	| bind¹ |User visible
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> /dev/ioasid²	| G-SVA/IOVA	|  cgroup	| No	|Yes
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> char dev³	| SVA		|  cgroup	| Yes	|No
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> iommu driver	| default PASID|  no		| No	|No

Is this PASID #0?

> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> kernel		| super SVA	| no		| yes   |No
> --------------------------------------------------------------------

Also wondering about device driver allocating auxiliary domains for their
private use, to do iommu_map/unmap on private PASIDs (a clean replacement
to super SVA, for example). Would that go through the same path as
/dev/ioasid and use the cgroup of current task?

Thanks,
Jean

> 
> ¹ Allocated during SVA bind
> ² PASIDs allocated via /dev/ioasid are not bound to any mm. But its
>   ownership is assigned to the process that does the allocation.
> ³ Include uacce, other private device driver char dev such as idxd
> 
> Currently, the proposed /dev/ioasid interface does not map individual PASID
> with an FD. The FD is at the ioasid_set granularity and bond to the current
> mm. We could extend the IOCTLs to cover individual PASID-FD passing case
> when use cases arise. Would this work?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jacob