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Message-ID: <f9c0087d299be1b9b91b242f41ac6ef7b9ee3ef7.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Tue, 23 Mar 2021 14:07:20 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     "kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 17:35 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello Horia,
> 
> On 21.03.21 21:48, Horia Geantă wrote:
> > On 3/16/2021 7:02 PM, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > [...]
> >> +struct trusted_key_ops caam_trusted_key_ops = {
> >> +	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
> >> +	.init = trusted_caam_init,
> >> +	.seal = trusted_caam_seal,
> >> +	.unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
> >> +	.exit = trusted_caam_exit,
> >> +};
> > caam has random number generation capabilities, so it's worth using that
> > by implementing .get_random.
> 
> If the CAAM HWRNG is already seeding the kernel RNG, why not use the kernel's?
> 
> Makes for less code duplication IMO.

Using kernel RNG, in general, for trusted keys has been discussed
before.   Please refer to Dave Safford's detailed explanation for not
using it [1].

thanks,

Mimi

[1] 
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/BCA04D5D9A3B764C9B7405BBA4D4A3C035F2A38B@ALPMBAPA12.e2k.ad.ge.com/
 

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