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Message-Id: <20210324170436.31843-19-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 12:04:24 -0500
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc: ak@...ux.intel.com, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: [RFC Part2 PATCH 18/30] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command
The KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command can be used to insert data into the
guest's memory. The data is encrypted with the cryptographic context
created with the KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START.
In addition to the inserting data, it can insert a two special pages
into the guests memory: the secrets page and the CPUID page.
For more information see the SEV-SNP spec section 4.5 and 8.12.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 18 ++++++
2 files changed, 154 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7652e57f7e01..1a0c8c95d178 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1247,6 +1247,139 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return rc;
}
+static struct kvm_memory_slot *hva_to_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva)
+{
+ struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+
+ kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots) {
+ if (hva >= memslot->userspace_addr &&
+ hva < memslot->userspace_addr + (memslot->npages << PAGE_SHIFT))
+ return memslot;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool hva_to_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva, gpa_t *gpa)
+{
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+ gpa_t gpa_offset;
+
+ memslot = hva_to_memslot(kvm, hva);
+ if (!memslot)
+ return false;
+
+ gpa_offset = hva - memslot->userspace_addr;
+ *gpa = ((memslot->base_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + gpa_offset);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ unsigned long npages, vaddr, vaddr_end, i, next_vaddr;
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_snp_launch_update *data;
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update params;
+ int *error = &argp->error;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ struct page **inpages;
+ struct rmpupdate e;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (!sev->snp_context)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data->gctx_paddr = __sme_page_pa(sev->snp_context);
+ data->vmpl1_perms = 0xf;
+ data->vmpl2_perms = 0xf;
+ data->vmpl3_perms = 0xf;
+
+ /* Lock the user memory. */
+ inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.uaddr, params.len, &npages, 1);
+ if (!inpages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0);
+ vaddr = params.uaddr;
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + params.len;
+
+ for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i++) {
+ unsigned long psize, pmask;
+ int level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+ gpa_t gpa;
+
+ if (!hva_to_gpa(kvm, vaddr, &gpa)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto e_unpin;
+ }
+
+ psize = page_level_size(level);
+ pmask = page_level_mask(level);
+ gpa = gpa & pmask;
+
+ /* Transition the page state to pre-guest */
+ memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
+ e.assigned = 1;
+ e.gpa = gpa;
+ e.asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+ e.immutable = true;
+ e.pagesize = X86_RMP_PG_LEVEL(level);
+ ret = rmptable_rmpupdate(inpages[i], &e);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_unpin;
+ }
+
+ data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]);
+ data->page_size = e.pagesize;
+ data->page_type = params.page_type;
+ ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, data, error);
+ if (ret) {
+ snp_page_reclaim(inpages[i], e.pagesize);
+ goto e_unpin;
+ }
+
+ next_vaddr = (vaddr & pmask) + psize;
+ }
+
+e_unpin:
+ /* Content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+ memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+ mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+
+ /*
+ * If its an error, then update RMP entry to change page ownership
+ * to the hypervisor.
+ */
+ if (ret)
+ rmptable_rmpupdate(inpages[i], &e);
+ }
+
+ /* Unlock the user pages */
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
+
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1303,6 +1436,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START:
r = snp_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE:
+ r = snp_launch_update(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 84a242597d81..a9f7aa9e412d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1597,6 +1597,7 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
/* SNP specific commands */
KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT,
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START,
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
};
@@ -1656,6 +1657,23 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
__u8 imi_en;
};
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA 0x2
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS 0x5
+#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID 0x6
+
+struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update {
+ __u64 uaddr;
+ __u32 len;
+ __u8 imi_page;
+ __u8 page_type;
+ __u8 vmpl3_perms;
+ __u8 vmpl2_perms;
+ __u8 vmpl1_perms;
+};
+
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
--
2.17.1
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