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Message-ID: <63dd7d4b-4729-9e03-cd8f-956b94eab0d9@pengutronix.de>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 10:26:14 +0100
From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: "kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
CAAM-based trusted keys
Hello Mimi,
On 23.03.21 19:07, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 17:35 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
>> On 21.03.21 21:48, Horia Geantă wrote:
>>> caam has random number generation capabilities, so it's worth using that
>>> by implementing .get_random.
>>
>> If the CAAM HWRNG is already seeding the kernel RNG, why not use the kernel's?
>>
>> Makes for less code duplication IMO.
>
> Using kernel RNG, in general, for trusted keys has been discussed
> before. Please refer to Dave Safford's detailed explanation for not
> using it [1].
The argument seems to boil down to:
- TPM RNG are known to be of good quality
- Trusted keys always used it so far
Both are fine by me for TPMs, but the CAAM backend is new code and neither point
really applies.
get_random_bytes_wait is already used for generating key material elsewhere.
Why shouldn't new trusted key backends be able to do the same thing?
Cheers,
Ahmad
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
> [1]
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/BCA04D5D9A3B764C9B7405BBA4D4A3C035F2A38B@ALPMBAPA12.e2k.ad.ge.com/
>
>
>
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