linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] integrity: double check iint

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Message-ID: <ca2b63a47c2910072397d41448c46293750456f7.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 24 Mar 2021 07:49:17 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc:     linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] integrity: double check iint_cache was
 initialized

On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 12:37 +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 12:21 PM Tetsuo Handa
> <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> >
> > On 2021/03/24 20:10, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 19:10 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > >> On 2021/03/24 1:13, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > >>> On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 00:14 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > >>>> On 2021/03/23 23:47, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > >>>>> Initially I also questioned making "integrity" an LSM.  Perhaps it's
> > >>>>> time to reconsider.   For now, it makes sense to just fix the NULL
> > >>>>> pointer dereferencing.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Do we think calling panic() as "fix the NULL pointer dereferencing" ?
> > >>>
> > >>> Not supplying "integrity" as an "lsm=" option is a user error.  There
> > >>> are only two options - allow or deny the caller to proceed.   If the
> > >>> user is expecting the integrity subsystem to be properly working,
> > >>> returning a NULL and allowing the system to boot (RFC patch version)
> > >>> does not make sense.   Better to fail early.
> > >>
> > >> What does the "user" mean? Those who load the vmlinux?
> > >> Only the "root" user (so called administrators)?
> > >> Any users including other than "root" user?
> > >>
> > >> If the user means those who load the vmlinux, that user is explicitly asking
> > >> for disabling "integrity" for some reason. In that case, it is a bug if
> > >> booting with "integrity" disabled is impossible.
> > >>
> > >> If the user means something other than those who load the vmlinux,
> > >> is there a possibility that that user (especially non "root" users) is
> > >> allowed to try to use "integrity" ? If processes other than global init
> > >> process can try to use "integrity", wouldn't it be a DoS attack vector?
> > >> Please explain in the descripotion why calling panic() does not cause
> > >> DoS attack vector.
> > >
> > > User in this case, is anyone rebooting the system and is intentionally
> > > changing the default values, dropping the "integrity" option on the
> > > boot command line.
> >
> > OK. Then, I expect that the system boots instead of calling panic().
> > That user is explicitly asking for disabling "integrity" for some reason.
> 
> That was actually my intention. The prebuilt kernel that I use for
> things has all LSMs enabled, but then I needed to try some workload
> with only 1 specific LSM, so I gave a different lsm= argument.

IMA/EVM is dependent on "integrity".  Was your intention to also
disable IMA and EVM?  If so, when disabling "integrity", don't load an
IMA policy.

Mimi