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Message-ID: <557b92d2-f3b8-d136-7431-419429f0e059@pengutronix.de>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 15:07:30 +0100
From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
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<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
CAAM-based trusted keys
Hello Sumit,
On 24.03.21 11:47, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Wed, 24 Mar 2021 at 14:56, Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Mimi,
>>
>> On 23.03.21 19:07, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 17:35 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
>>>> On 21.03.21 21:48, Horia Geantă wrote:
>>>>> caam has random number generation capabilities, so it's worth using that
>>>>> by implementing .get_random.
>>>>
>>>> If the CAAM HWRNG is already seeding the kernel RNG, why not use the kernel's?
>>>>
>>>> Makes for less code duplication IMO.
>>>
>>> Using kernel RNG, in general, for trusted keys has been discussed
>>> before. Please refer to Dave Safford's detailed explanation for not
>>> using it [1].
>>
>> The argument seems to boil down to:
>>
>> - TPM RNG are known to be of good quality
>> - Trusted keys always used it so far
>>
>> Both are fine by me for TPMs, but the CAAM backend is new code and neither point
>> really applies.
>>
>> get_random_bytes_wait is already used for generating key material elsewhere.
>> Why shouldn't new trusted key backends be able to do the same thing?
>>
>
> Please refer to documented trusted keys behaviour here [1]. New
> trusted key backends should align to this behaviour and in your case
> CAAM offers HWRNG so we should be better using that.
Why is it better?
Can you explain what benefit a CAAM user would have if the trusted key
randomness comes directly out of the CAAM instead of indirectly from
the kernel entropy pool that is seeded by it?
> Also, do update documentation corresponding to CAAM as a trusted keys backend.
Yes. The documentation should be updated for CAAM and it should describe
how the key material is derived. Will do so for v2.
Cheers,
Ahmad
>
> [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/tree/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst#n87
>
> -Sumit
>
>> Cheers,
>> Ahmad
>>
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>>
>>> Mimi
>>>
>>> [1]
>>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/BCA04D5D9A3B764C9B7405BBA4D4A3C035F2A38B@ALPMBAPA12.e2k.ad.ge.com/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
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>
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