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Message-ID: <20210325122112.htkwkt3emura5day@wittgenstein>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 13:21:12 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Cc: "zohar@...ux.ibm.com" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
"mjg59@...gle.com" <mjg59@...gle.com>,
"agruenba@...hat.com" <agruenba@...hat.com>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/11] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for
unmodified metadata
On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 01:13:41PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 10:53:43AM +0000, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > From: Roberto Sassu
> > > Sent: Friday, March 5, 2021 4:19 PM
> > > With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature
> > > verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the
> > > end of the process verification succeeds.
> > >
> > > However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the
> > > correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds
> > > before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains files
> > > owned by root and the archive is extracted by root.
> > >
> > > Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent operations
> > > fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter
> > > the current value).
> > >
> > > This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user
> > > space when that operation does not alter the current value of xattrs/attrs.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> > > ---
> > > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 96
> > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > index eab536fa260f..a07516dcb920 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/integrity.h>
> > > #include <linux/evm.h>
> > > #include <linux/magic.h>
> > > +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
> > >
> > > #include <crypto/hash.h>
> > > #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> > > @@ -328,6 +329,79 @@ static enum integrity_status
> > > evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
> > > return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
> > > }
> > >
> > > +/*
> > > + * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode
> > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > > + * @xattr_name: requested xattr
> > > + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
> > > + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
> > > + *
> > > + * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by
> > > EVM.
> > > + *
> > > + * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise.
> > > + */
> > > +static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct dentry *dentry, const char
> > > *xattr_name,
> > > + const void *xattr_value, size_t
> > > xattr_value_len)
> > > +{
> > > + umode_t mode;
> > > + struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res;
> > > + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > > + int rc;
> > > +
> > > + /* UID/GID in ACL have been already converted from user to init ns
> > > */
> > > + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value,
> > > xattr_value_len);
> > > + if (!acl)
> >
> > Based on Mimi's review, I will change this to:
> >
> > if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl))
> >
> > > + return 1;
> > > +
> > > + acl_res = acl;
> > > + rc = posix_acl_update_mode(&init_user_ns, inode, &mode,
> > > &acl_res);
> >
> > About this part, probably it is not correct.
> >
> > I'm writing a test for this patch that checks if operations
> > that don't change the file mode succeed and those that
> > do fail.
> >
> > mount-idmapped --map-mount b:3001:0:1 /mnt /mnt-idmapped
> > pushd /mnt
> > echo "test" > test-file
> > chown 3001 test-file
> > chgrp 3001 test-file
> > chmod 2644 test-file
> > <check enabled>
> > setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file (expected to succeed, caller has CAP_FSETID, so S_ISGID is not dropped)
> > setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file (expected to fail)
> > pushd /mnt-idmapped
> > capsh --drop=cap_fsetid -- -c setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file (expected to succeed, caller is in the owning group of test-file, so S_ISGID is not dropped)
> >
> > After adding a debug line in posix_acl_update_mode():
> > printk("%s: %d(%d) %d\n", __func__, in_group_p(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)), __kgid_val(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)), capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID));
> >
> > without passing mnt_userns:
> > [ 748.262582] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file
> > [ 748.268021] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [ 748.268035] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [ 748.268570] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file
> > [ 748.274193] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [ 748.279198] capsh --drop=cap_fsetid -- -c setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file
> > [ 748.287894] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 0
> >
> > passing mnt_userns:
> > [ 81.159766] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file
> > [ 81.165207] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [ 81.165226] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [ 81.165732] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file
> > [ 81.170978] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [ 81.176014] capsh --drop=cap_fsetid -- -c setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file
> > [ 81.184648] posix_acl_update_mode: 1(0) 0
> > [ 81.184663] posix_acl_update_mode: 1(0) 0
> >
> > The difference is that, by passing mnt_userns, the caller (root) is
> > in the owning group of the file (3001 -> 0). Without passing mnt_userns,
> > it is not (3001 -> 3001).
> >
> > Christian, Andreas, could you confirm that this is correct?
>
> Hey Robert,
s/Robert/Roberto/
Sorry for the typo.
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