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Message-ID: <afeac310-c6aa-f9d8-6c90-e7e7f21ddf9a@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 15:09:18 +0100
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Aili Yao <yaoaili@...gsoft.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, naoya.horiguchi@....com
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
yangfeng1@...gsoft.com, sunhao2@...gsoft.com,
Oscar Salvador <osalvador@...e.de>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] mm/gup: check page hwposion status for coredump.
On 22.03.21 12:33, Aili Yao wrote:
> When we do coredump for user process signal, this may be one SIGBUS signal
> with BUS_MCEERR_AR or BUS_MCEERR_AO code, which means this signal is
> resulted from ECC memory fail like SRAR or SRAO, we expect the memory
> recovery work is finished correctly, then the get_dump_page() will not
> return the error page as its process pte is set invalid by
> memory_failure().
>
> But memory_failure() may fail, and the process's related pte may not be
> correctly set invalid, for current code, we will return the poison page,
> get it dumped, and then lead to system panic as its in kernel code.
>
> So check the hwpoison status in get_dump_page(), and if TRUE, return NULL.
>
> There maybe other scenario that is also better to check hwposion status
> and not to panic, so make a wrapper for this check, Thanks to David's
> suggestion(<david@...hat.com>).
>
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210319104437.6f30e80d@alex-virtual-machine
> Signed-off-by: Aili Yao <yaoaili@...gsoft.com>
> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@....com>
> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@...e.de>
> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>
> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@...gsoft.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> ---
> mm/gup.c | 4 ++++
> mm/internal.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
> index e4c224c..6f7e1aa 100644
> --- a/mm/gup.c
> +++ b/mm/gup.c
> @@ -1536,6 +1536,10 @@ struct page *get_dump_page(unsigned long addr)
> FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_DUMP | FOLL_GET);
> if (locked)
> mmap_read_unlock(mm);
Thinking again, wouldn't we get -EFAULT from __get_user_pages_locked()
when stumbling over a hwpoisoned page?
See __get_user_pages_locked()->__get_user_pages()->faultin_page():
handle_mm_fault()->vm_fault_to_errno(), which translates
VM_FAULT_HWPOISON to -EFAULT, unless FOLL_HWPOISON is set (-> -EHWPOISON)
?
> +
> + if (ret == 1 && is_page_hwpoison(page))
> + return NULL;
> +
> return (ret == 1) ? page : NULL;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_ELF_CORE */
> diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h
> index 25d2b2439..b751cef 100644
> --- a/mm/internal.h
> +++ b/mm/internal.h
> @@ -97,6 +97,26 @@ static inline void set_page_refcounted(struct page *page)
> set_page_count(page, 1);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * When kernel touch the user page, the user page may be have been marked
> + * poison but still mapped in user space, if without this page, the kernel
> + * can guarantee the data integrity and operation success, the kernel is
> + * better to check the posion status and avoid touching it, be good not to
> + * panic, coredump for process fatal signal is a sample case matching this
> + * scenario. Or if kernel can't guarantee the data integrity, it's better
> + * not to call this function, let kernel touch the poison page and get to
> + * panic.
> + */
> +static inline bool is_page_hwpoison(struct page *page)
> +{
> + if (PageHWPoison(page))
> + return true;
> + else if (PageHuge(page) && PageHWPoison(compound_head(page)))
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> extern unsigned long highest_memmap_pfn;
>
> /*
>
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
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