linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v10 2/6] arm64: kvm: Introduce MTE VM feature

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Date:   Sun, 28 Mar 2021 13:21:33 +0100
From:   Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To:     Steven Price <steven.price@....com>
Cc:     Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@...il.com>,
        Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
        Juan Quintela <quintela@...hat.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
        Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@...aro.org>,
        Haibo Xu <Haibo.Xu@....com>, Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 2/6] arm64: kvm: Introduce MTE VM feature

On Sat, Mar 27, 2021 at 03:23:24PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 03:18:58PM +0000, Steven Price wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> > index 77cb2d28f2a4..b31b7a821f90 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> > @@ -879,6 +879,22 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >  	if (vma_pagesize == PAGE_SIZE && !force_pte)
> >  		vma_pagesize = transparent_hugepage_adjust(memslot, hva,
> >  							   &pfn, &fault_ipa);
> > +
> > +	if (fault_status != FSC_PERM && kvm_has_mte(kvm) && pfn_valid(pfn)) {
> > +		/*
> > +		 * VM will be able to see the page's tags, so we must ensure
> > +		 * they have been initialised. if PG_mte_tagged is set, tags
> > +		 * have already been initialised.
> > +		 */
> > +		struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
> > +		unsigned long i, nr_pages = vma_pagesize >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> > +
> > +		for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++) {
> > +			if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags))
> > +				mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page));
> > +		}
> > +	}
> 
> This pfn_valid() check may be problematic. Following commit eeb0753ba27b
> ("arm64/mm: Fix pfn_valid() for ZONE_DEVICE based memory"), it returns
> true for ZONE_DEVICE memory but such memory is allowed not to support
> MTE.

Some more thinking, this should be safe as any ZONE_DEVICE would be
mapped as untagged memory in the kernel linear map. It could be slightly
inefficient if it unnecessarily tries to clear tags in ZONE_DEVICE,
untagged memory. Another overhead is pfn_valid() which will likely end
up calling memblock_is_map_memory().

However, the bigger issue is that Stage 2 cannot disable tagging for
Stage 1 unless the memory is Non-cacheable or Device at S2. Is there a
way to detect what gets mapped in the guest as Normal Cacheable memory
and make sure it's only early memory or hotplug but no ZONE_DEVICE (or
something else like on-chip memory)?  If we can't guarantee that all
Cacheable memory given to a guest supports tags, we should disable the
feature altogether.

> I now wonder if we can get a MAP_ANONYMOUS mapping of ZONE_DEVICE pfn
> even without virtualisation.

I haven't checked all the code paths but I don't think we can get a
MAP_ANONYMOUS mapping of ZONE_DEVICE memory as we normally need a file
descriptor.

-- 
Catalin