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Message-ID: <CAAeHK+zyv1=kXtKAynnJN-77dwmPG4TXpJOLv_3W0nxXe5NjXA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 16:54:26 +0200
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@...il.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
wsd_upstream <wsd_upstream@...iatek.com>,
"moderated list:ARM/Mediatek SoC..."
<linux-mediatek@...ts.infradead.org>,
Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kasan: remove redundant config option
On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 2:25 AM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com> wrote:
>
> CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
> instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
> CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1].
>
> When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
> prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.
>
> [1]: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221
>
> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@...il.com>
> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> ---
>
> v4: After this patch sent, someone had modification about KASAN_STACK,
> so I need to rebase codebase. Thank Andrey for your pointing.
>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +-
> include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +-
> lib/Kconfig.kasan | 8 ++------
> mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 2 +-
> scripts/Makefile.kasan | 10 ++++++++--
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 4 ++--
> 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> index 5bfd9b87f85d..4ea9392f86e0 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
> */
> bl cpu_do_resume
>
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> mov x0, sp
> bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> index 56b6865afb2a..d5d8a352eafa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
> movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
> movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
>
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> /*
> * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
> * which we now need to unpoison.
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index b91732bd05d7..14f72ec96492 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
> #else
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> index 624ae1df7984..cffc2ebbf185 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> @@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ config KASAN_INLINE
>
> endchoice
>
> -config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
> +config KASAN_STACK
> bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
> depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
> + default y if CC_IS_GCC
> help
> The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
> causes excessive stack usage in a lot of functions, see
> @@ -154,11 +155,6 @@ config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
> CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST. On gcc it is assumed to always be safe
> to use and enabled by default.
>
> -config KASAN_STACK
> - int
> - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
> - default 0
> -
> config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
> bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
> depends on KASAN_SW_TAGS
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index b5e08d4cefec..7b53291dafa1 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
> kasan_unpoison(address, size);
> }
>
> -#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
> void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 8c55634d6edd..3436c6bf7c0c 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
> const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
> void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
>
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr);
> #else
> static inline void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr) { }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> index 41f374585144..de732bc341c5 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
> memcpy(buffer, kasan_mem_to_shadow(row), META_BYTES_PER_ROW);
> }
>
> -#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> static bool __must_check tokenize_frame_descr(const char **frame_descr,
> char *token, size_t max_tok_len,
> unsigned long *value)
> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kasan b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> index 1e000cc2e7b4..abf231d209b1 100644
> --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
> CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin
> KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ?= $(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
>
> +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> + stack_enable := 1
> +else
> + stack_enable := 0
> +endif
> +
> ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
>
> ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
> @@ -27,7 +33,7 @@ else
> CFLAGS_KASAN := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_SHADOW) \
> $(call cc-param,asan-globals=1) \
> $(call cc-param,asan-instrumentation-with-call-threshold=$(call_threshold)) \
> - $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
> + $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(stack_enable)) \
> $(call cc-param,asan-instrument-allocas=1)
> endif
>
> @@ -42,7 +48,7 @@ else
> endif
>
> CFLAGS_KASAN := -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress \
> - -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) \
> + -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(stack_enable) \
> -mllvm -hwasan-use-short-granules=0 \
> $(instrumentation_flags)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 269967c4fc1b..a56c36470cb1 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ choice
> config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
> bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
> depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> - depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
> + depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
> select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> help
> Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
> @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ choice
> config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
> bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
> depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> - depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
> + depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
> select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> help
> Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
> --
> 2.18.0
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@...glegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu%40mediatek.com.
Hi Andrew,
Looks like my patch "kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS"
that was merged into 5.12-rc causes a build time warning:
include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not
defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef]
#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
The fix for it would either be reverting the patch (which would leave
the initial issue unfixed) or applying this "kasan: remove redundant
config option" patch.
Would it be possible to send this patch (with the fix-up you have in
mm) for the next 5.12-rc?
Here are the required tags:
Fixes: d9b571c885a8 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Thanks!
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