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Date:   Tue, 30 Mar 2021 15:55:59 -0400
From:   Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>,
        "linux-pm@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "crecklin@...hat.com" <crecklin@...hat.com>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Fix hibernation in FIPS mode?

On Tue, 2021-03-30 at 21:45 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 30 Mar 2021 at 20:05, Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, 2021-03-30 at 16:46 +0200, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote:
> > > On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 12:14 AM Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com> wrote:
> > > > Hi,
> > > > MD5 was marked incompliant with FIPS in 2009:
> > > > a3bef3a31a19 ("crypto: testmgr - Skip algs not flagged fips_allowed in fips mode")
> > > > a1915d51e8e7 ("crypto: testmgr - Mark algs allowed in fips mode")
> > > > 
> > > > But hibernation_e820_save() is still using MD5, and fails in FIPS mode
> > > > due to the 2018 patch:
> > > > 749fa17093ff ("PM / hibernate: Check the success of generating md5 digest before hibernation")
> > > > 
> > > > As a result, hibernation doesn't work when FIPS is on.
> > > > 
> > > > Do you think if hibernation_e820_save() should be changed to use a
> > > > FIPS-compliant algorithm like SHA-1?
> > > 
> > > I would say yes, it should.
> > > 
> > > > PS, currently it looks like FIPS mode is broken in the mainline:
> > > > https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg49414.html
> > 
> > FYI, SHA-1 is not a good choice, it is only permitted in HMAC
> > constructions and only for specified uses. If you need to change
> > algorithm you should go straight to SHA-2 or SHA-3 based hashes.
> > 
> 
> What is the reason for using a [broken] cryptographic hash here? if
> this is just an integrity check, better use CRC32

If the integrity check is used exclusively to verify there were no
accidental changes and is not used as a security measure, by all means
I agree that using crc32 is a better idea.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat, Inc




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