linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

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Message-ID: <2034693332.137003.1617219379831.JavaMail.zimbra@nod.at>
Date:   Wed, 31 Mar 2021 21:36:19 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To:     James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        horia geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        aymen sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        davem <davem@...emloft.net>, kernel <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        david <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list, ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

James,

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "James Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Well, yes.  For the TPM, there's a defined ASN.1 format for the keys:
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/tree/tpm2-asn.h
> 
> and part of the design of the file is that it's distinguishable either
> in DER or PEM (by the guards) format so any crypto application can know
> it's dealing with a TPM key simply by inspecting the file.  I think you
> need the same thing for CAAM and any other format.
> 
> We're encouraging new ASN.1 formats to be of the form
> 
> SEQUENCE {
>    type   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
>    ... key specific fields ...
> }
> 
> Where you choose a defined OID to represent the key and that means
> every key even in DER form begins with a unique binary signature.

I like this idea.
Ahmad, what do you think?

That way we could also get rid off the kernel parameter and all the fall back logic,
given that we find a way to reliable detect TEE blobs too...

Thanks,
//richard