[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <YGQXnqNsG0iUljvk@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 06:33:02 +0000
From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 11:03:10PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Regardless, I still endorse this change because it doesn't make things
> _worse_, since without this, a compromised process wouldn't need ANY
> tricks to escape a chroot because it wouldn't be in one. :) It'd be nice
> if there were some way to make future openat() calls be unable to
> resolve outside the chroot, but I view that as an enhancement.
>
> But, as it stands, I think this makes sense and I stand by my
> Reviewed-by tag. If Al is too busy to take it, and James would rather
> not take VFS, perhaps akpm would carry it? That's where other similar
> VFS security work has landed.
Frankly, I'm less than fond of that thing, but right now I'm buried
under all kinds of crap (->d_revalidate() joy, mostly). I'll post
a review, but for now it's very definitely does *not* get an implicit
ACK from me.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists