linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] psi: allow unprivileged users with CAP_SYS

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Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 11:10:09 -0700
From:   Josh Hunt <johunt@...mai.com>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] psi: allow unprivileged users with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to
 write psi files

On 4/1/21 10:47 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
> 
>> On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 11:36:28PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Josh Hunt <johunt@...mai.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> Currently only root can write files under /proc/pressure. Relax this to
>>>> allow tasks running as unprivileged users with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to be
>>>> able to write to these files.
>>>
>>> The test for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE really needs to be in open rather
>>> than in write.
>>>
>>> Otherwise a suid root executable could have stdout redirected
>>> into these files.
>>
>> Right. Or check against f_cred. (See uses of kallsyms_show_value())
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html*open-file-credentials__;Iw!!GjvTz_vk!B_aeVyHMG20VNUGx001EFKpeYlahLQHye7oS8sokXuZOhVDTtF_deDl71a_KYA$
> 
> We really want to limit checking against f_cred to those cases where we
> break userspace by checking in open.  AKA the cases where we made the
> mistake of putting the permission check in the wrong place and now can't
> fix it.
> 
> Since this change is change the permissions that open uses already I
> don't see any reason we can't perform a proper check in open.
> 
> Eric
> 

Thank you for the feedback. I will spin a v2 doing the check in open.

Josh