linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

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Message-ID: <1846277009.140163.1617285566823.JavaMail.zimbra@nod.at>
Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 15:59:26 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To:     Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc:     Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        horia geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        aymen sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        davem <davem@...emloft.net>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        kernel <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@...gutronix.de>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        david <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list, ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

Sumit,

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> In this case why would one prefer to use CAAM when you have standards
> compliant TPM-Chip which additionally offers sealing to specific PCR
> (integrity measurement) values.

I don't think we can dictate what good/sane solutions are and which are not.
Both CAAM and TPM have pros and cons, I don't see why supporting both is a bad idea.

>> > IMHO allowing only one backend at the same time is a little over simplified.
>>
>> It is, but I'd rather leave this until it's actually needed.
>> What can be done now is adopting a format for the exported keys that would
>> make this extension seamless in future.
>>
> 
> +1

As long we don't make multiple backends at runtime impossible I'm
fine and will happily add support for it when needed. :-)

Thanks,
//richard