linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20210402014950.GA6897@mail.hallyn.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 20:49:50 -0500
From:   "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To:     James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        "kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
        Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
 CAAM-based trusted keys

On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 09:14:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 14:07 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 17:35 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > > Hello Horia,
> > > 
> > > On 21.03.21 21:48, Horia Geantă wrote:
> > > > On 3/16/2021 7:02 PM, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > > > [...]
> > > > > +struct trusted_key_ops caam_trusted_key_ops = {
> > > > > +	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
> > > > > +	.init = trusted_caam_init,
> > > > > +	.seal = trusted_caam_seal,
> > > > > +	.unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
> > > > > +	.exit = trusted_caam_exit,
> > > > > +};
> > > > caam has random number generation capabilities, so it's worth
> > > > using that
> > > > by implementing .get_random.
> > > 
> > > If the CAAM HWRNG is already seeding the kernel RNG, why not use
> > > the kernel's?
> > > 
> > > Makes for less code duplication IMO.
> > 
> > Using kernel RNG, in general, for trusted keys has been discussed
> > before.   Please refer to Dave Safford's detailed explanation for not
> > using it [1].
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > Mimi
> > 
> > [1] 
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/BCA04D5D9A3B764C9B7405BBA4D4A3C035F2A38B@ALPMBAPA12.e2k.ad.ge.com/
> 
> I still don't think relying on one source of randomness to be
> cryptographically secure is a good idea.  The fear of bugs in the
> kernel entropy pool is reasonable, but since it's widely used they're
> unlikely to persist very long.

I'm not sure I agree - remember
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/random_number_b.html ?  You'd
surely expect that to have been found quickly.

>   Studies have shown that some TPMs
> (notably the chinese manufactured ones) have suspicious failures in
> their RNGs:
> 
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45934562_Benchmarking_the_True_Random_Number_Generator_of_TPM_Chips
> 
> And most cryptograhpers recommend using a TPM for entropy mixing rather
> than directly:
> 
> https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/category/rngs/
> 
> The TPMFail paper also shows that in spite of NIST certification
> things can go wrong with a TPM:
> 
> https://tpm.fail/

In this thread I've seen argument over "which is better" and "which is user api",
but noone's mentioned fips.  Unfortunately, so long as kernel rng refuses to be
fips-friendly (cf https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/21/157), making CAAM based trusted
keys depend on kernel rng would make them impossible to use in fips certified
applications without a forked kernel.

So I definitely am in favor of a config or kernel command line option to drive
which rng to use.