linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 02/28] ipv6: weaken the v4mapped source check

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Message-Id: <20210405085017.088152864@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  5 Apr 2021 10:53:36 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Sunyi Shao <sunyishao@...com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 02/28] ipv6: weaken the v4mapped source check

From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>

[ Upstream commit dcc32f4f183ab8479041b23a1525d48233df1d43 ]

This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3.

Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped
source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses.
Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not
allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02

lists potential issues.

Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses,
and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped
addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used
for uni-direction event streams or packet export.

Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with
TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6
and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with
v4mapped address as the source.

Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the
user-visible changes.

Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address")
Reported-by: Sunyi Shao <sunyishao@...com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
Acked-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 net/dccp/ipv6.c      |  5 +++++
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ----------
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c  |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 736cc95b5201..bb1a7405dc0e 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -313,6 +313,11 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb))
 		return 0;	/* discard, don't send a reset here */
 
+	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) {
+		IP6_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (dccp_bad_service_code(sk, service)) {
 		dcb->dccpd_reset_code = DCCP_RESET_CODE_BAD_SERVICE_CODE;
 		goto drop;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
index c83c0faf5ae9..9075acf081dd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
@@ -151,16 +151,6 @@ int ipv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct packet_type *pt
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
 		goto err;
 
-	/* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
-	 * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
-	 * model can not deal properly with these.
-	 * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
-	 *
-	 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
-	 */
-	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
-		goto err;
-
 	skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
 	IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index b4ffcec732b4..53e15514d90d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -978,6 +978,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb))
 		goto drop;
 
+	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) {
+		IP6_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	return tcp_conn_request(&tcp6_request_sock_ops,
 				&tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb);
 
-- 
2.30.1