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Message-ID: <CAHRSSEyp2ffVBaeJ4-uO=F02ppdh6j_jwf5AgxpFfNAHuwZXEw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2021 13:26:28 -0700
From: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
To: Hang Lu <hangl@...eaurora.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@...roid.com>,
Martijn Coenen <maco@...roid.com>,
Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@...roid.com>,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@...gle.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>, rdunlap@...radead.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] binder: tell userspace to dump current backtrace when
detecting oneway spamming
On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 1:29 AM Hang Lu <hangl@...eaurora.org> wrote:
>
> When async binder buffer got exhausted, some normal oneway transaction
> will also be discarded and finally caused system/app stop.
"...be discarded and may cause system or application failures" ?
> By that time,
> the binder debug information we dump may not relevant to the root cause.
"may not be relevant"
> And this issue is difficult to debug if without the backtrace of thread
> sending spam.
"...backtrace of the thread..."
>
> This change will send BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT to userspace when detecting
> oneway spamming, request to dump current backtrace.
"to userspace when oneway spamming is detected
> The detection will
> happened only once when exceeding the threshold (target process dips
"Oneway spamming will be reported only once..."
> below 80% of its oneway space, and current process is responsible for
> either more than 50 transactions, or more than 50% of the oneway space).
> And the detection will restart when the async buffer has returned to a
> healthy state.
>
> Signed-off-by: Hang Lu <hangl@...eaurora.org>
> ---
> v2: make the detection on/off switch to be per-proc
>
> drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
> drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
> drivers/android/binder_alloc.h | 8 +++++++-
> drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 4 ++++
> include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h | 8 ++++++++
> 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index c119736..93964d1 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3007,7 +3007,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> goto err_bad_object_type;
> }
> }
> - tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
> + if (t->buffer->oneway_spam_suspect)
> + tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT;
> + else
> + tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
> t->work.type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION;
>
> if (reply) {
> @@ -3875,9 +3878,14 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
>
> binder_stat_br(proc, thread, cmd);
> } break;
> - case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: {
> + case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE:
> + case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT: {
> + if (proc->oneway_spam_detection_enabled &&
> + w->type == BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT)
> + cmd = BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT;
Doesn't "BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT" need to be added to binder_return_strings[]?
> + else
> + cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
> binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
> - cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
> kfree(w);
> binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
> if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr))
> @@ -4727,6 +4735,18 @@ static long binder_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> }
> break;
> }
> + case BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION: {
> + uint32_t enable;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&enable, ubuf, sizeof(enable))) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto err;
> + }
> + binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
> + proc->oneway_spam_detection_enabled = (bool)enable;
> + binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
> + break;
> + }
> default:
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto err;
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
> index 7caf74a..a09872b 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
> @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct *binder_alloc_get_vma(
> return vma;
> }
>
> -static void debug_low_async_space_locked(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int pid)
> +static bool debug_low_async_space_locked(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int pid)
> {
> /*
> * Find the amount and size of buffers allocated by the current caller;
> @@ -366,13 +366,19 @@ static void debug_low_async_space_locked(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int pid)
>
> /*
> * Warn if this pid has more than 50 transactions, or more than 50% of
> - * async space (which is 25% of total buffer size).
> + * async space (which is 25% of total buffer size). Oneway spam only
> + * detect once when exceed the threshold.
"Oneway spam is only detected when the threshold is exceeded"
> */
> if (num_buffers > 50 || total_alloc_size > alloc->buffer_size / 4) {
> binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_USER_ERROR,
> "%d: pid %d spamming oneway? %zd buffers allocated for a total size of %zd\n",
> alloc->pid, pid, num_buffers, total_alloc_size);
> + if (!alloc->oneway_spam_detected) {
> + alloc->oneway_spam_detected = true;
> + return true;
> + }
> }
> + return false;
> }
>
> static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_new_buf_locked(
> @@ -525,6 +531,7 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_new_buf_locked(
> buffer->async_transaction = is_async;
> buffer->extra_buffers_size = extra_buffers_size;
> buffer->pid = pid;
> + buffer->oneway_spam_suspect = false;
> if (is_async) {
> alloc->free_async_space -= size + sizeof(struct binder_buffer);
> binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_BUFFER_ALLOC_ASYNC,
> @@ -536,7 +543,9 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_new_buf_locked(
> * of async space left (which is less than 10% of total
> * buffer size).
> */
> - debug_low_async_space_locked(alloc, pid);
> + buffer->oneway_spam_suspect = debug_low_async_space_locked(alloc, pid);
> + } else {
> + alloc->oneway_spam_detected = false;
> }
> }
> return buffer;
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
> index 6e8e001..7dea57a 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct binder_transaction;
> * @clear_on_free: %true if buffer must be zeroed after use
> * @allow_user_free: %true if user is allowed to free buffer
> * @async_transaction: %true if buffer is in use for an async txn
> + * @oneway_spam_suspect: %true if total async allocate size just exceed
> + * spamming detect threshold
> * @debug_id: unique ID for debugging
> * @transaction: pointer to associated struct binder_transaction
> * @target_node: struct binder_node associated with this buffer
> @@ -45,7 +47,8 @@ struct binder_buffer {
> unsigned clear_on_free:1;
> unsigned allow_user_free:1;
> unsigned async_transaction:1;
> - unsigned debug_id:28;
> + unsigned oneway_spam_suspect:1;
> + unsigned debug_id:27;
>
> struct binder_transaction *transaction;
>
> @@ -87,6 +90,8 @@ struct binder_lru_page {
> * @buffer_size: size of address space specified via mmap
> * @pid: pid for associated binder_proc (invariant after init)
> * @pages_high: high watermark of offset in @pages
> + * @oneway_spam_detected: %true if oneway spam detection fired, clear that
> + * flag once the async buffer has returned to a healthy state
> *
> * Bookkeeping structure for per-proc address space management for binder
> * buffers. It is normally initialized during binder_init() and binder_mmap()
> @@ -107,6 +112,7 @@ struct binder_alloc {
> uint32_t buffer_free;
> int pid;
> size_t pages_high;
> + bool oneway_spam_detected;
> };
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_IPC_SELFTEST
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
> index 6cd7901..eb87669 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct binder_work {
> enum binder_work_type {
> BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION = 1,
> BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE,
> + BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT,
> BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR,
> BINDER_WORK_NODE,
> BINDER_WORK_DEAD_BINDER,
> @@ -396,6 +397,8 @@ struct binder_ref {
> * @outer_lock: no nesting under innor or node lock
> * Lock order: 1) outer, 2) node, 3) inner
> * @binderfs_entry: process-specific binderfs log file
> + * @oneway_spam_detection_enabled: process enabled oneway spam detection
> + * or not
> *
> * Bookkeeping structure for binder processes
> */
> @@ -426,6 +429,7 @@ struct binder_proc {
> spinlock_t inner_lock;
> spinlock_t outer_lock;
> struct dentry *binderfs_entry;
> + bool oneway_spam_detection_enabled;
> };
>
> /**
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h b/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h
> index ec84ad1..d0da772 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h
> @@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ struct binder_node_info_for_ref {
> #define BINDER_GET_NODE_DEBUG_INFO _IOWR('b', 11, struct binder_node_debug_info)
> #define BINDER_GET_NODE_INFO_FOR_REF _IOWR('b', 12, struct binder_node_info_for_ref)
> #define BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR_EXT _IOW('b', 13, struct flat_binder_object)
> +#define BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION _IOW('b', 15, __u32)
>
> /*
> * NOTE: Two special error codes you should check for when calling
> @@ -408,6 +409,13 @@ enum binder_driver_return_protocol {
> * The last transaction (either a bcTRANSACTION or
> * a bcATTEMPT_ACQUIRE) failed (e.g. out of memory). No parameters.
> */
> +
> + BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT = _IO('r', 19),
> + /*
> + * Current process sent too many oneway calls to target, and the last
> + * asynchronous transaction makes the allocated async buffer size exceed
> + * detection threshold. No parameters.
> + */
> };
>
> enum binder_driver_command_protocol {
> --
> The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum,
> a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project
>
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