linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V4 05/18] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and allocation APIs

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Date:   Tue, 6 Apr 2021 09:35:17 +0800
From:   Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>,
        "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>
Cc:     Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "cgroups@...r.kernel.org" <cgroups@...r.kernel.org>,
        Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>,
        Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.com>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        Eric Auger <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>, "Wu, Hao" <hao.wu@...el.com>,
        "Jiang, Dave" <dave.jiang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V4 05/18] iommu/ioasid: Redefine IOASID set and allocation
 APIs


在 2021/4/6 上午7:42, Jason Gunthorpe 写道:
> On Fri, Apr 02, 2021 at 08:22:28AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>>> From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2021 9:29 PM
>>>
>>>> First, userspace may use ioasid in a non-SVA scenario where ioasid is
>>>> bound to specific security context (e.g. a control vq in vDPA) instead of
>>>> tying to mm. In this case there is no pgtable binding initiated from user
>>>> space. Instead, ioasid is allocated from /dev/ioasid and then programmed
>>>> to the intended security context through specific passthrough framework
>>>> which manages that context.
>>> This sounds like the exact opposite of what I'd like to see.
>>>
>>> I do not want to see every subsystem gaining APIs to program a
>>> PASID. All of that should be consolidated in *one place*.
>>>
>>> I do not want to see VDPA and VFIO have two nearly identical sets of
>>> APIs to control the PASID.
>>>
>>> Drivers consuming a PASID, like VDPA, should consume the PASID and do
>>> nothing more than authorize the HW to use it.
>>>
>>> quemu should have general code under the viommu driver that drives
>>> /dev/ioasid to create PASID's and manage the IO mapping according to
>>> the guest's needs.
>>>
>>> Drivers like VDPA and VFIO should simply accept that PASID and
>>> configure/authorize their HW to do DMA's with its tag.
>>>
>> I agree with you on consolidating things in one place (especially for the
>> general SVA support). But here I was referring to an usage without
>> pgtable binding (Possibly Jason. W can say more here), where the
>> userspace just wants to allocate PASIDs, program/accept PASIDs to
>> various workqueues (device specific), and then use MAP/UNMAP
>> interface to manage address spaces associated with each PASID.
>> I just wanted to point out that the latter two steps are through
>> VFIO/VDPA specific interfaces.
> No, don't do that.
>
> VFIO and VDPA has no buisness having map/unmap interfaces once we have
> /dev/ioasid. That all belongs in the iosaid side.
>
> I know they have those interfaces today, but that doesn't mean we have
> to keep using them for PASID use cases, they should be replaced with a
> 'do dma from this pasid on /dev/ioasid' interface certainly not a
> 'here is a pasid from /dev/ioasid, go ahead and configure it youself'
> interface


So it looks like the PASID was bound to SVA in this design. I think it's 
not necessairly the case:

1) PASID can be implemented without SVA, in this case a map/unmap 
interface is still required
2) For the case that hypervisor want to do some mediation in the middle 
for a virtqueue. e.g in the case of control vq that is implemented in 
the VF/ADI/SF itself, the hardware virtqueue needs to be controlled by 
Qemu, Though binding qemu's page table to cvq can work but it looks like 
a overkill, a small dedicated buffers that is mapped for this PASID 
seems more suitalbe.


>
> This is because PASID is *complicated* in the general case! For
> instance all the two level stuff you are talking about must not leak
> into every user!
>
> Jason


So do you mean the device should not expose the PASID confiugration API 
to guest? I think it could happen if we assign the whole device and let 
guest to configure it for nested VMs.

Thanks


>