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Message-ID: <20210409114313.4073-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2021 13:43:09 +0200
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
To: <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
CC: <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] ima: Introduce exec_tcb and tmpfs policies
This patch introduces two new hard-coded policies, named exec_tcb and
tmpfs. The first excludes the FILE_CHECK rules to measure only files
executed and mmapped. The second excludes the dont_measure rule for the
tmpfs filesystem for the ima_tcb, tcb and exec_tcb policies, as this could
be used as a way for an attacker to hide his actions. The new policies can
be selected by specifying them as a value of ima_policy= in the kernel
command line.
The benefit of using the exec_tcb policy, as opposed to the tcb policy, is
that most likely the measurement list will contain only immutable files,
recognizable from a set of reference values from software vendors. However,
this policy provides a less accurate view of the integrity of the system,
as opened files are excluded from measurement.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 ++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 42 ++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 04545725f187..88c2ba679c92 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1765,6 +1765,13 @@
mode bit set by either the effective uid (euid=0) or
uid=0.
+ The "exec_tcb" policy is similar to the "tcb" policy
+ except for opened files, which are not measured.
+
+ The "tmpfs" policy excludes the dont_measure rule for
+ the tmpfs filesystem, for the "ima_tcb", "tcb" and
+ "exec_tcb" policies.
+
The "appraise_tcb" policy appraises the integrity of
all files owned by root.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 33b5133645b3..fff178abb004 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
#define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
+#define IMA_SKIP_TMPFS 0x1000
+#define IMA_SKIP_OPEN 0x2000
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -105,7 +107,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,
+ .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_SKIP_TMPFS},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -126,7 +129,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID | IMA_SKIP_OPEN},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
@@ -138,10 +141,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_SKIP_OPEN},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID | IMA_SKIP_OPEN},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+static unsigned int ima_measure_skip_flags __initdata;
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata;
@@ -243,7 +247,12 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
continue;
if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
- else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
+ else if ((strcmp(p, "tmpfs") == 0))
+ ima_measure_skip_flags |= IMA_SKIP_TMPFS;
+ else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) {
+ ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+ ima_measure_skip_flags |= IMA_SKIP_OPEN;
+ } else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
ima_use_secure_boot = true;
@@ -739,13 +748,16 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
}
static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
- enum policy_rule_list policy_rule)
+ enum policy_rule_list policy_rule, int skip_flags)
{
int i = 0;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ if (entries[i].flags & skip_flags)
+ continue;
+
if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY)
list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -824,18 +836,18 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
if (ima_policy)
add_rules(dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules),
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, ima_measure_skip_flags);
switch (ima_policy) {
case ORIGINAL_TCB:
add_rules(original_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules),
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, ima_measure_skip_flags);
break;
case DEFAULT_TCB:
add_rules(default_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules),
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, ima_measure_skip_flags);
default:
break;
}
@@ -851,7 +863,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
pr_info("No architecture policies found\n");
else
add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY, 0);
/*
* Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
@@ -859,7 +871,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
*/
if (ima_use_secure_boot)
add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules),
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, 0);
/*
* Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures
@@ -871,21 +883,21 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
if (build_appraise_entries) {
if (ima_use_secure_boot)
add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
- IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
+ IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY, 0);
else
add_rules(build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries,
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY, 0);
}
if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
add_rules(default_appraise_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, 0);
if (ima_use_critical_data)
add_rules(critical_data_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
- IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, 0);
ima_update_policy_flag();
}
--
2.26.2
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