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Message-ID: <20210412114901.GB24283@zn.tnic>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 13:49:01 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
ak@...ux.intel.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH 13/13] x86/kernel: add support to validate
memory when changing C-bit
On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 11:44:24AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> @@ -161,3 +162,108 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr
> /* Ask hypervisor to make the memory shared in the RMP table. */
> early_snp_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
> }
> +
> +static int snp_page_state_vmgexit(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct snp_page_state_change *data)
That function name definitely needs changing. The
vmgexit_page_state_change() one too. They're currenty confusing as hell
and I can't know what each one does without looking at its function
body.
> +{
> + struct snp_page_state_header *hdr;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + hdr = &data->header;
> +
> + /*
> + * The hypervisor can return before processing all the entries, the loop below retries
> + * until all the entries are processed.
> + */
> + while (hdr->cur_entry <= hdr->end_entry) {
This doesn't make any sense: snp_set_page_state() builds a "set" of
pages to change their state in a loop and this one iterates *again* over
*something* which I'm not even clear on what.
Is something setting cur_entry to end_entry eventually?
In any case, why not issue those page state changes one-by-one in
snp_set_page_state() or is it possible that HV can do a couple of
them in one go so you have to poke it here until it sets cur_entry ==
end_entry?
> + ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, (u64)__pa(data));
Why do you have to call that here for every loop iteration...
> + ret = vmgexit_page_state_change(ghcb, data);
.... and in that function too?!
> + /* Page State Change VMGEXIT can pass error code through exit_info_2. */
> + if (ret || ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
You don't need that ret variable - just return value directly.
> +}
> +
> +static void snp_set_page_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
> +{
> + unsigned long paddr_end, paddr_next;
> + struct snp_page_state_change *data;
> + struct snp_page_state_header *hdr;
> + struct snp_page_state_entry *e;
> + struct ghcb_state state;
> + struct ghcb *ghcb;
> + int ret, idx;
> +
> + paddr = paddr & PAGE_MASK;
> + paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
> +
> + ghcb = sev_es_get_ghcb(&state);
That function can return NULL.
> + data = (struct snp_page_state_change *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
> + hdr = &data->header;
> + e = &(data->entry[0]);
So
e = data->entry;
?
> + memset(data, 0, sizeof (*data));
> +
> + for (idx = 0; paddr < paddr_end; paddr = paddr_next) {
As before, a while loop pls.
> + int level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
Why does this needs to happen on each loop iteration? It looks to me you
wanna do below:
e->pagesize = X86_RMP_PG_LEVEL(PG_LEVEL_4K);
instead.
> +
> + /* If we cannot fit more request then issue VMGEXIT before going further. */
any more requests
No "we" pls.
> + if (hdr->end_entry == (SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_MAX_ENTRY - 1)) {
> + ret = snp_page_state_vmgexit(ghcb, data);
> + if (ret)
> + goto e_fail;
WARN
> +
> + idx = 0;
> + memset(data, 0, sizeof (*data));
> + e = &(data->entry[0]);
> + }
The order of the operations in this function looks weird: what you
should do is:
- clear stuff, memset etc.
- build shared buffer
- issue vmgexit
so that you don't have the memset and e reinit twice and the flow can
be more clear and you don't have two snp_page_state_vmgexit() function
calls when there's a trailing set of entries which haven't reached
SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_MAX_ENTRY.
Maybe a double-loop or so.
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index 16f878c26667..19ee18ddbc37 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
> #include <asm/proto.h>
> #include <asm/memtype.h>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
> +#include <asm/sev-snp.h>
>
> #include "../mm_internal.h"
>
> @@ -2001,8 +2003,25 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> */
> cpa_flush(&cpa, !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT));
>
> + /*
> + * To maintain the security gurantees of SEV-SNP guest invalidate the memory before
> + * clearing the encryption attribute.
> + */
Align that comment on 80 cols, just like the rest of the comments do in
this file. Below too.
> + if (sev_snp_active() && !enc) {
Push that sev_snp_active() inside the function. Below too.
> + ret = snp_set_memory_shared(addr, numpages);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
>
> + /*
> + * Now that memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate the memory range before
> + * we return from here.
> + */
> + if (!ret && sev_snp_active() && enc)
> + ret = snp_set_memory_private(addr, numpages);
> +
> /*
> * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs again
> * in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need to flush
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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