linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.11 058/210] bpf: Refcount task stack in bpf_get_task

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Message-Id: <20210412084017.932826772@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 12 Apr 2021 10:39:23 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@...com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.11 058/210] bpf: Refcount task stack in bpf_get_task_stack

From: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@...com>

commit 06ab134ce8ecfa5a69e850f88f81c8a4c3fa91df upstream.

On x86 the struct pt_regs * grabbed by task_pt_regs() points to an
offset of task->stack. The pt_regs are later dereferenced in
__bpf_get_stack (e.g. by user_mode() check). This can cause a fault if
the task in question exits while bpf_get_task_stack is executing, as
warned by task_stack_page's comment:

* When accessing the stack of a non-current task that might exit, use
* try_get_task_stack() instead.  task_stack_page will return a pointer
* that could get freed out from under you.

Taking the comment's advice and using try_get_task_stack() and
put_task_stack() to hold task->stack refcount, or bail early if it's
already 0. Incrementing stack_refcount will ensure the task's stack
sticks around while we're using its data.

I noticed this bug while testing a bpf task iter similar to
bpf_iter_task_stack in selftests, except mine grabbed user stack, and
getting intermittent crashes, which resulted in dumps like:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000003fe0
  \#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  \#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  RIP: 0010:__bpf_get_stack+0xd0/0x230
  <snip...>
  Call Trace:
  bpf_prog_0a2be35c092cb190_get_task_stacks+0x5d/0x3ec
  bpf_iter_run_prog+0x24/0x81
  __task_seq_show+0x58/0x80
  bpf_seq_read+0xf7/0x3d0
  vfs_read+0x91/0x140
  ksys_read+0x59/0xd0
  do_syscall_64+0x48/0x120
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: fa28dcb82a38 ("bpf: Introduce helper bpf_get_task_stack()")
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@...com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210401000747.3648767-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c |   12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -652,9 +652,17 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_stac
 BPF_CALL_4(bpf_get_task_stack, struct task_struct *, task, void *, buf,
 	   u32, size, u64, flags)
 {
-	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
+	struct pt_regs *regs;
+	long res;
 
-	return __bpf_get_stack(regs, task, NULL, buf, size, flags);
+	if (!try_get_task_stack(task))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	regs = task_pt_regs(task);
+	res = __bpf_get_stack(regs, task, NULL, buf, size, flags);
+	put_task_stack(task);
+
+	return res;
 }
 
 BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_get_task_stack_btf_ids, struct, task_struct)