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Message-ID: <20210413151909.GA13549@alpha.franken.de>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 17:19:09 +0200
From: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
Cc: Jinyang He <hejinyang@...ngson.cn>,
Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@...ngson.cn>,
"linux-mips@...r.kernel.org" <linux-mips@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] MIPS: Fix strnlen_user access check
On Tue, Apr 13, 2021 at 12:37:25PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>
> > Sent: 13 April 2021 12:15
> ...
> > > The __access_ok() is noted with `Ensure that the range [addr, addr+size)
> > > is within the process's address space`. Does the range checked by
> > > __access_ok() on MIPS is [addr, addr+size]. So if we want to use
> > > access_ok(s, 1), should we modify __access_ok()? Or my misunderstanding?
> >
> > you are right, I'm going to apply
> >
> > https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mips/patch/20190209194718.1294-1-paul.burton@mips.com/
> >
> > to fix that.
>
> Isn't that still wrong?
> If an application does:
> write(fd, (void *)0xffff0000, 0);
> it should return 0, not -1 and EFAULT/SIGSEGV.
WRITE(2) Linux Programmer's Manual WRITE(2)
[...]
If count is zero and fd refers to a regular file, then write() may
return a failure status if one of the errors below is detected. If no
errors are detected, or error detection is not performed, 0 will be
returned without causing any other effect. If count is zero and fd
refers to a file other than a regular file, the results are not speci-
fied.
[...]
EFAULT buf is outside your accessible address space.
at least it's covered by the man page on my Linux system.
> There is also the question about why this makes any difference
> to the original problem of logging in via the graphical interface.
kernel/module.c: mod->args = strndup_user(uargs, ~0UL >> 1);
and strndup_user does a strnlen_user.
> ISTM that it is very unlikely that the length passed to strnlen_user()
> is long enough to take potential buffer beyond the end of user
> address space.
see above.
Thomas.
--
Crap can work. Given enough thrust pigs will fly, but it's not necessarily a
good idea. [ RFC1925, 2.3 ]
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