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Date:   Thu, 15 Apr 2021 11:08:31 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
Cc:     Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org" <rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/13] [RFC] Rust support

On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 08:26:21AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> ...
> > Besides just FP, 128-bit, etc, I remain concerned about just basic
> > math operations. C has no way to describe the intent of integer
> > overflow, so the kernel was left with the only "predictable" result:
> > wrap around. Unfortunately, this is wrong in most cases, and we're left
> > with entire classes of vulnerability related to such overflows.
> 
> I'm not sure any of the alternatives (except perhaps panic)
> are much better.
> Many years ago I used a COBOL system that skipped the assignment
> if ADD X to Y (y += x) would overflow.
> That gave a very hard to spot error when the sump of a long list
> way a little too large.
> If it had wrapped the error would be obvious.
> 
> There are certainly places where saturate is good.
> Mostly when dealing with analogue samples.
> 
> I guess the problematic code is stuff that checks:
> 	if (foo->size + constant > limit) goto error;
> instead of:
> 	if (foo->size > limit - constant) goto error;

Right. This and alloc(size * count) are the primary offenders. :)

-- 
Kees Cook

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