linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/6] bpf: Add a ARG_PTR_TO_CONST

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Date:   Mon, 19 Apr 2021 15:54:04 -0700
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>
Cc:     bpf@...r.kernel.org, ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net,
        andrii@...nel.org, yhs@...com, kpsingh@...nel.org,
        jackmanb@...omium.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/6] bpf: Add a ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR argument
 type

On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 05:52:39PM +0200, Florent Revest wrote:
> This type provides the guarantee that an argument is going to be a const
> pointer to somewhere in a read-only map value. It also checks that this
> pointer is followed by a zero character before the end of the map value.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>
> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/bpf.h   |  1 +
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> index 77d1d8c65b81..c160526fc8bf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ enum bpf_arg_type {
>  	ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID,	/* pointer to in-kernel percpu type */
>  	ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC,	/* pointer to a bpf program function */
>  	ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL,	/* pointer to stack or NULL */
> +	ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR,	/* pointer to a null terminated read-only string */
>  	__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX,
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 852541a435ef..5f46dd6f3383 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -4787,6 +4787,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALU
>  static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID } };
>  static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } };
>  static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } };
> +static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
>  
>  static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = {
>  	[ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]		= &map_key_value_types,
> @@ -4817,6 +4818,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = {
>  	[ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID]	= &percpu_btf_ptr_types,
>  	[ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC]		= &func_ptr_types,
>  	[ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL]	= &stack_ptr_types,
> +	[ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR]		= &const_str_ptr_types,
>  };
>  
>  static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
> @@ -5067,6 +5069,45 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
>  		if (err)
>  			return err;
>  		err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true);
> +	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR) {
> +		struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
> +		int map_off;
> +		u64 map_addr;
> +		char *str_ptr;
> +
> +		if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || !map ||

I think the 'type' check is redundant,
since check_reg_type() did it via compatible_reg_types.
If so it's probably better to remove it here ?

'!map' looks unnecessary. Can it ever happen? If yes, it's a verifier bug.
For example in check_mem_access() we just deref reg->map_ptr without checking
which, I think, is correct.

> +		    !bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {

This check is needed, of course.

> +			verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
> +			return -EACCES;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> +			verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
> +			return -EACCES;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
> +			verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
> +			return -EACCES;
> +		}
> +
> +		err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
> +				       map->value_size - reg->off, false);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +
> +		map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
> +		err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
> +		if (err) {

since the code checks it here the same check in check_bpf_snprintf_call() should
probably do:
 if (err) {
   verbose("verifier bug\n");
   return -EFAULT;
 }

instead of just "return err;"
?

> +			verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");

I think the message doesn't tell users much, but they probably should never
see it unless they try to do lookup from readonly array with
more than one element.
So I guess it's fine to keep this one as-is. Just flagging.

Anyway the whole set looks great, so I've applied to bpf-next.
Thanks!