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Message-ID: <56d8b80c-ce2c-ed86-0eda-253768d8d463@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 11:40:56 +0200
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@...com>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
x86@...nel.org, kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] secretmem: optimize page_is_secretmem()
On 19.04.21 11:38, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 19.04.21 11:36, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 11:15:02AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>> On 19.04.21 10:42, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
>>>>
>>>> Kernel test robot reported -4.2% regression of will-it-scale.per_thread_ops
>>>> due to commit "mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret"
>>>> memory areas".
>>>>
>>>> The perf profile of the test indicated that the regression is caused by
>>>> page_is_secretmem() called from gup_pte_range() (inlined by gup_pgd_range):
>>>>
>>>> 27.76 +2.5 30.23 perf-profile.children.cycles-pp.gup_pgd_range
>>>> 0.00 +3.2 3.19 ± 2% perf-profile.children.cycles-pp.page_mapping
>>>> 0.00 +3.7 3.66 ± 2% perf-profile.children.cycles-pp.page_is_secretmem
>>>>
>>>> Further analysis showed that the slow down happens because neither
>>>> page_is_secretmem() nor page_mapping() are not inline and moreover,
>>>> multiple page flags checks in page_mapping() involve calling
>>>> compound_head() several times for the same page.
>>>>
>>>> Make page_is_secretmem() inline and replace page_mapping() with page flag
>>>> checks that do not imply page-to-head conversion.
>>>>
>>>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> @Andrew,
>>>> The patch is vs v5.12-rc7-mmots-2021-04-15-16-28, I'd appreciate if it would
>>>> be added as a fixup to the memfd_secret series.
>>>>
>>>> include/linux/secretmem.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>> mm/secretmem.c | 12 +-----------
>>>> 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h
>>>> index 907a6734059c..b842b38cbeb1 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h
>>>> @@ -4,8 +4,32 @@
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM
>>>> +extern const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops;
>>>> +
>>>> +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct address_space *mapping;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Using page_mapping() is quite slow because of the actual call
>>>> + * instruction and repeated compound_head(page) inside the
>>>> + * page_mapping() function.
>>>> + * We know that secretmem pages are not compound and LRU so we can
>>>> + * save a couple of cycles here.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (PageCompound(page) || !PageLRU(page))
>>>> + return false;
>>>
>>> I'd assume secretmem pages are rare in basically every setup out there. So
>>> maybe throwing in a couple of likely()/unlikely() might make sense.
>>
>> I'd say we could do unlikely(page_is_secretmem()) at call sites. Here I can
>> hardly estimate which pages are going to be checked.
>>
>>>> +
>>>> + mapping = (struct address_space *)
>>>> + ((unsigned long)page->mapping & ~PAGE_MAPPING_FLAGS);
>>>> +
>>>
>>> Not sure if open-coding page_mapping is really a good idea here -- or even
>>> necessary after the fast path above is in place. Anyhow, just my 2 cents.
>>
>> Well, most if the -4.2% of the performance regression kbuild reported were
>> due to repeated compount_head(page) in page_mapping(). So the whole point
>> of this patch is to avoid calling page_mapping().
>
> I would have thought the fast path "(PageCompound(page) ||
> !PageLRU(page))" would already avoid calling page_mapping() in many cases.
(and I do wonder if a generic page_mapping() optimization would make
sense instead)
Willy can most probably give the best advise here :)
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
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