linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.10 092/103] bpf: Use correct permission flag for mixed signed bounds arithmetic

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Message-Id: <20210419130530.956055833@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 19 Apr 2021 15:06:43 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 092/103] bpf: Use correct permission flag for mixed signed bounds arithmetic

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>

[ Upstream commit 9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be ]

We forbid adding unknown scalars with mixed signed bounds due to the
spectre v1 masking mitigation. Hence this also needs bypass_spec_v1
flag instead of allow_ptr_leaks.

Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 12cd2997f982..2eaefd9c4152 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5522,7 +5522,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
 		return -EACCES;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
-		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
+		if (!env->env->bypass_spec_v1 && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
 			verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
 				off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
 			return -EACCES;
-- 
2.30.2