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Message-ID: <202104211245.F5FEC8D15D@keescook>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 12:49:14 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aditya Pakki <pakki001@....edu>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, kjlu@....edu,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
Roland Dreier <roland@...estorage.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 113/190] Revert "x86/hpet: Prevent potential NULL pointer
dereference"
On Wed, Apr 21, 2021 at 02:59:48PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This reverts commit 2e84f116afca3719c9d0a1a78b47b48f75fd5724.
>
> Commits from @umn.edu addresses have been found to be submitted in "bad
> faith" to try to test the kernel community's ability to review "known
> malicious" changes. The result of these submissions can be found in a
> paper published at the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
> entitled, "Open Source Insecurity: Stealthily Introducing
> Vulnerabilities via Hypocrite Commits" written by Qiushi Wu (University
> of Minnesota) and Kangjie Lu (University of Minnesota).
>
> Because of this, all submissions from this group must be reverted from
> the kernel tree and will need to be re-reviewed again to determine if
> they actually are a valid fix. Until that work is complete, remove this
> change to ensure that no problems are being introduced into the
> codebase.
>
> Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@....edu>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: kjlu@....edu
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
> Cc: Roland Dreier <roland@...estorage.com>
> Cc: https
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 2 --
> 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
> index 08651a4e6aa0..0515a97bf6f5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
> @@ -930,8 +930,6 @@ int __init hpet_enable(void)
> return 0;
>
> hpet_set_mapping();
> - if (!hpet_virt_address)
> - return 0;
>
> /* Validate that the config register is working */
> if (!hpet_cfg_working())
FWIW, this patch looks harmless. It is checking for a failure in
hpet_set_mapping(), and avoids the following code from performing
0-offset reads. hpet_set_mapping() is likely to never fail in real-world
situations. *shrug*
I think it would make more sense for the check to live in
hpet_cfg_working(), though.
--
Kees Cook
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