| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <e888aa66-25d3-f72c-1aa9-cd5bc6df3789@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 16:09:51 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, paul@...l-moore.com
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] security: Support multiple LSMs implementing the
inode_init_security hook
On 4/21/2021 9:19 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> The current implementation of security_inode_init_security() is capable
of
> handling only one LSM providing an xattr to be set at inode creation. That
> xattr is then passed to EVM to calculate the HMAC.
>
> To support multiple LSMs, each providing an xattr, this patch makes the
> following modifications:
>
> security_inode_init_security():
> - dynamically allocates new_xattrs, based on the number of
> inode_init_security hooks registered by LSMs;
> - replaces the call_int_hook() macro with its definition, to correctly
> handle the case of an LSM returning -EOPNOTSUPP (the loop should not be
> stopped).
>
> security_old_inode_init_security():
> - replaces the call_int_hook() macro with its definition, to stop the loop
> at the first LSM providing an xattr, to avoid a memory leak (due to
> overwriting the *value pointer).
>
> The modifications necessary for EVM to calculate the HMAC on all xattrs
> will be done in a separate patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> ---
> security/security.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2c1fe1496069..2ab67fa4422e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -30,8 +30,6 @@
> #include <linux/msg.h>
> #include <net/flow.h>
>
> -#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
> -
> /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
> #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
>
> @@ -1028,9 +1026,10 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> const struct qstr *qstr,
> const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
> {
> - struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
> + struct xattr *new_xattrs;
> struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
> - int ret;
> + struct security_hook_list *P;
> + int ret, max_new_xattrs = 0;
>
> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
> return 0;
> @@ -1038,14 +1037,52 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> if (!initxattrs)
> return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
> dir, qstr, NULL, fs_data);
> - memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
> +
> + /* Determine at run-time the max number of xattr structs to allocate.
*/
> + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, list)
> + max_new_xattrs++;
Don't do this here! You can count the number of modules providing inode_init_security
hooks when the modules register and save the value for use here. It's not
going to
change.
> +
> + if (!max_new_xattrs)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
> + new_xattrs = kcalloc(max_new_xattrs + 2, sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
> + if (!new_xattrs)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
> - ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
> - lsm_xattr, fs_data);
> - if (ret)
> + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
> + list) {
> + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
> + fs_data);
> + if (ret) {
> + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + goto out;
> +
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> + /* LSM implementation error. */
> + if (lsm_xattr->name == NULL || lsm_xattr->value == NULL) {
> + WARN_ONCE(
> + "LSM %s: ret = 0 but xattr name/value = NULL\n",
> + P->lsm);
> + ret = -ENOENT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + lsm_xattr++;
> +
> + if (!--max_new_xattrs)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (!new_xattrs->name) {
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> goto out;
> + }
>
> - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
> + evm_xattr = lsm_xattr;
> ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
+ ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, lsm_xattr);
then you don't need evm_xattr at all.
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> @@ -1053,6 +1090,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> out:
> for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
> kfree(xattr->value);
> + kfree(new_xattrs);
> return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
> @@ -1071,11 +1109,44 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> {
> struct xattr xattr = { .name = NULL, .value = NULL, .value_len = 0 };
> struct xattr *lsm_xattr = (name && value && len) ? &xattr : NULL;
> + struct security_hook_list *P;
> + int ret;
>
> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
> - qstr, lsm_xattr, NULL);
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
> + list) {
> + ret = P->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, lsm_xattr,
> + NULL);
> + if (ret) {
> + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + return ret;
> +
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> + if (!lsm_xattr)
> + continue;
> +
> + /* LSM implementation error. */
> + if (lsm_xattr->name == NULL || lsm_xattr->value == NULL) {
> + WARN_ONCE(
> + "LSM %s: ret = 0 but xattr name/value = NULL\n",
> + P->lsm);
> +
> + /* Callers should do the cleanup. */
> + return -ENOENT;
> + }
> +
> + *name = lsm_xattr->name;
> + *value = lsm_xattr->value;
> + *len = lsm_xattr->value_len;
> +
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists