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Message-Id: <20210423131640.20080-5-david@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 15:16:37 +0200
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Greg Ungerer <gerg@...ux-m68k.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@...iatek.com>,
Michel Lespinasse <walken@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@...radead.org>,
Huang Ying <ying.huang@...el.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Feng Tang <feng.tang@...el.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <Kevin.Brodsky@....com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Shawn Anastasio <shawn@...stas.io>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>,
Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@...cle.com>,
Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@...sigma.com>,
Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@...gle.com>,
Collin Fijalkovich <cfijalkovich@...gle.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: [PATCH RFC 4/7] binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
At exec time when we mmap the new executable via MAP_DENYWRITE we have it
opened via do_open_execat() and already deny_write_access()'ed the file
successfully. Once exec completes, we allow_write_acces(); however,
we set mm->exe_file in begin_new_exec() via set_mm_exe_file() and
also deny_write_access() as long as mm->exe_file remains set. We'll
effectively deny write access to our executable via mm->exe_file
until mm->exe_file is changed -- when the process is removed, on new
exec, or via sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE).
Let's remove all usage of MAP_DENYWRITE, it's no longer necessary for
mm->exe_file.
In case of an elf interpreter, we'll now only deny write access to the file
during exec. This is somewhat okay, because the interpreter behaves
(and sometime is) a shared library; all shared libraries, especially the
ones loaded directly in user space like via dlopen() won't ever be mapped
via MAP_DENYWRITE, because we ignore that from user space completely;
these shared libraries can always be modified while mapped and executed.
Let's only special-case the main executable, denying write access while
being executed by a process. This can be considered a minor user space
visible change.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
---
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 6 ++----
fs/binfmt_aout.c | 5 ++---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++--
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
index 321d7b22ad2d..9bd15241fadb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
@@ -202,8 +202,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text,
PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC,
- MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE |
- MAP_32BIT,
+ MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_32BIT,
fd_offset);
if (error != N_TXTADDR(ex))
@@ -211,8 +210,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
- MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE |
- MAP_32BIT,
+ MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_32BIT,
fd_offset + ex.a_text);
if (error != N_DATADDR(ex))
return error;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_aout.c b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
index 37df8fee63d7..9c44892d6469 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
@@ -221,8 +221,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
}
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text,
- PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC,
- MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
+ PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE;
fd_offset);
if (error != N_TXTADDR(ex))
@@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
error = vm_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
- MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
+ MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE;
fd_offset + ex.a_text);
if (error != N_DATADDR(ex))
return error;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 763188ac398e..76bb342e9c9b 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,
eppnt = interp_elf_phdata;
for (i = 0; i < interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) {
- int elf_type = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
+ int elf_type = MAP_PRIVATE;
int elf_prot = make_prot(eppnt->p_flags, arch_state,
true, true);
unsigned long vaddr = 0;
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
elf_prot = make_prot(elf_ppnt->p_flags, &arch_state,
!!interpreter, false);
- elf_flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
+ elf_flags = MAP_PRIVATE;
vaddr = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
/*
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
index 8723b6686b66..18a9e42e41d1 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ static int elf_fdpic_map_file_by_direct_mmap(struct elf_fdpic_params *params,
if (phdr->p_flags & PF_W) prot |= PROT_WRITE;
if (phdr->p_flags & PF_X) prot |= PROT_EXEC;
- flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
+ flags = MAP_PRIVATE;
maddr = 0;
switch (params->flags & ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_ARRANGEMENT) {
--
2.30.2
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