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Message-ID: <20210423023408.GB2174828@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 22:34:08 -0400
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Cc: linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-ia64@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
On 2021-03-18 08:08, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2021-03-18 11:48, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > [+Cc Aleksa, the author of openat2()]
>
> Ah! Thanks for pulling in Aleksa. I thought I caught everyone...
>
> > and a comment below. :)
>
> Same...
>
> > On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 09:47:17PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9
> > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
> > >
> > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier.
> > >
> > > See the github issue
> > > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/alpha/kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/parisc/kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/parisc/kernel/compat_audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/powerpc/kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/powerpc/kernel/compat_audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/s390/kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/s390/kernel/compat_audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/sparc/kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/sparc/kernel/compat_audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/x86/ia32/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c | 2 ++
> > > kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++
> > > lib/audit.c | 4 ++++
> > > lib/compat_audit.c | 4 ++++
> > > 15 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/audit.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/audit.c
> > > index 96a9d18ff4c4..06a911b685d1 100644
> > > --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
> > > return 3;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c
> > > index 5192ca899fe6..5eaa888c8fd3 100644
> > > --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
> > > return 3;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/audit.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/audit.c
> > > index 9eb47b2225d2..fc721a7727ba 100644
> > > --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
> > > return 3;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/compat_audit.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > index 20c39c9d86a9..fc6d35918c44 100644
> > > --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ int parisc32_classify_syscall(unsigned syscall)
> > > return 3;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/audit.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/audit.c
> > > index a2dddd7f3d09..8f32700b0baa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
> > > return 4;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/compat_audit.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > index 55c6ccda0a85..ebe45534b1c9 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ int ppc32_classify_syscall(unsigned syscall)
> > > return 4;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/audit.c b/arch/s390/kernel/audit.c
> > > index d395c6c9944c..d964cb94cfaf 100644
> > > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
> > > return 4;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_audit.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > index 444fb1f66944..f7b32933ce0e 100644
> > > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ int s390_classify_syscall(unsigned syscall)
> > > return 4;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/audit.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/audit.c
> > > index a6e91bf34d48..b6dcca9c6520 100644
> > > --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned int syscall)
> > > return 4;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/compat_audit.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > index 10eeb4f15b20..d2652a1083ad 100644
> > > --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/compat_audit.c
> > > @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ int sparc32_classify_syscall(unsigned int syscall)
> > > return 4;
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c b/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c
> > > index 6efe6cb3768a..57a02ade5503 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c
> > > @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ int ia32_classify_syscall(unsigned syscall)
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > case __NR_execveat:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 1;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c
> > > index 83d9cad4e68b..39de1e021258 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c
> > > @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
> > > case __NR_execve:
> > > case __NR_execveat:
> > > return 5;
> > > + case __NR_openat2:
> > > + return 6;
> > > default:
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > index 8bb9ac84d2fb..f5616e70d129 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
> > > #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
> > > #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
> > > +#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h>
> > >
> > > #include "audit.h"
> > >
> > > @@ -195,6 +196,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
> > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
> > > case 5: /* execve */
> > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > > + case 6: /* openat2 */
> > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how *)ctx->argv[2])->flags);
> >
> > That looks a bit dodgy. Maybe sm like the below would be a bit better?
>
> Ah, ok, fair enough, since original flags use a u32 and this was picked
> as u64 for alignment. It was just occurring to me last night that I
> might have the dubious honour of being the first usage of 0%llo format
> specifier in the kernel... ;-)
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 47fb48f42c93..531e882a5096 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
> >
> > static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
> > {
> > + struct open_how *openat2;
> > unsigned n;
> > if (unlikely(!ctx))
> > return 0;
> > @@ -195,6 +196,12 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
> > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
> > case 5: /* execve */
> > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
> > + case 6: /* openat2 */
> > + openat2 = ctx->argv[2];
> > + if (upper_32_bits(openat2->flags))
> > + pr_warn("Some sensible warning about unknown flags");
> > +
> > + return mask & ACC_MODE(lower_32_bits(openat2->flags));
> > default:
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > (Ideally we'd probably notice at build-time that we've got flags
> > exceeding 32bits. Could probably easily been done by exposing an all
> > flags macro somewhere and then we can place a BUILD_BUG_ON() or sm into
> > such places.)
open_how arguments are translated to open_flags which is limited to 32 bits.
This code is shared with the other open functions that are limited to 32 bits
in open_flags. openat2 was created to avoid the limitations of openat, so at
some point it isn't unreasonable that flags exceed 32 bits, but open_flags
would have to be modified at that point to accommodate.
This value is handed in from userspace, and could be handed in without being
defined in the kernel, so those values need to be properly checked regardless
of the flags defined in the kernel.
The openat2 syscall claims to check all flags but no check is done on the top
32 bits.
build_open_flags() assigns how->flags to an int, effectively dropping the top
32 bits, before being checked against ~VALID_OPEN_FLAGS. This happens after
audit mode filtering, but has the same result.
Audit mode filtering using ACC_MODE() already masks out all but the lowest two
bits with O_ACCMODE, so there is no danger of overflowing a u32.
tomoyo_check_open_permission() assigns ACC_MODE() to u8 without a check.
All FMODE_* flags are clamped at u32.
6 bits remain at top and 4 bits just above O_ACCMODE, so there is no immediate
danger of overflow and if any additional mode bits are needed they are
available.
000377777703 used
037777777777 available
10 bits remaining
So, I don't think a check at this point in the code is useful, but do agree
that there should be some changes and checks added in sys_openat2 and
build_open_flags().
Also noticed: It looks like fddb5d430ad9f left in VALID_UPGRADE_FLAGS for
how->upgrade_mask that was removed. This may be used at a later date, but at
this point is dead code.
> > Christian
>
> - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
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