linux-kernel - linux-next: manual merge of the tpmdd tree with Linus' tree

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Message-ID: <20210423123921.181bbb3a@canb.auug.org.au>
Date:   Fri, 23 Apr 2021 12:39:21 +1000
From:   Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Next Mailing List <linux-next@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: linux-next: manual merge of the tpmdd tree with Linus' tree

Hi all,

Today's linux-next merge of the tpmdd tree got a conflict in:

  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c

between commit:

  9d5171eab462 ("KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM reservation for seal/unseal")

from Linus' tree and commit:

  f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")

from the tpmdd tree.

I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
complex conflicts.

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell

diff --cc security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index c87c4df8703d,d225ad140960..000000000000
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@@ -79,7 -245,10 +245,10 @@@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *
  	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
  		return -EINVAL;
  
+ 	if (!options->keyhandle)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
 -	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
 +	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
  	if (rc)
  		return rc;
  

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