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Message-ID: <20210427113732.471066-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:37:29 +0200
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
To: <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <jmorris@...ei.org>, <paul@...l-moore.com>,
<casey@...aufler-ca.com>
CC: <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
<reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/6] security: Pass xattrs allocated by LSMs to the inode_init_security hook
In preparation for moving EVM to the LSM infrastructure, this patch
replaces the name, value, len triple with the xattr array pointer provided
by security_inode_init_security(), and the base slot in the xattr array
where LSMs can write xattrs.
This patch also introduces the new helper lsm_find_xattr_slot(), to help
LSMs find available slots in the xattr array (with a subsequent patch it
will be possible to reserve more than one slot). The helper takes three
arguments: the xattr array, the pointer of the base slot, whose value is
incremented each time the helper is called, and the end slot so that the
helper does not return a slot outside the array.
Finally, this patch modifies also SELinux and Smack to use the new helper.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
security/security.c | 15 ++++++---------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 ++++++++-------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 477a597db013..20f91e93f511 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
- struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
- void **value, size_t *len)
+ struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
+ int *base_slot, void *fs_data)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c5498f5174ce..197d6662b262 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
/**
@@ -227,9 +228,13 @@
* @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
* @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
* @qstr contains the last path component of the new object
- * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
- * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
- * @len will be set to the length of the value.
+ * @xattrs contains the full array of xattrs allocated by LSMs where
+ * ->name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
+ * ->value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
+ * ->len will be set to the length of the value.
+ * @base_slot contains the position in @xattrs from where xattrs
+ * can be written.
+ * @fs_data contains filesystem-specific data.
* Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
* -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
* -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
@@ -1660,5 +1665,15 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+static inline struct xattr *lsm_find_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
+ int *base_slot, int end_slot)
+{
+ if (!xattrs)
+ return xattrs;
+
+ if (*base_slot >= end_slot)
+ return NULL;
+ return xattrs + (*base_slot)++;
+}
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 692a148ce764..527a18fd6742 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1043,26 +1043,23 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
{
struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
- struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
- int ret;
+ struct xattr *xattr;
+ int ret, base_slot = 0;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
if (!initxattrs)
return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
- dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ dir, qstr, NULL, &base_slot, fs_data);
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
- lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
- &lsm_xattr->name,
- &lsm_xattr->value,
- &lsm_xattr->value_len);
+ new_xattrs, &base_slot, fs_data);
if (ret)
goto out;
- evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
- ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+ ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,
+ new_xattrs + base_slot);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ddd097790d47..6319417129af 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2916,11 +2916,13 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
- const char **name,
- void **value, size_t *len)
+ struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot,
+ void *fs_data)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ struct xattr *xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs, base_slot,
+ *base_slot + 1);
u32 newsid, clen;
int rc;
char *context;
@@ -2947,16 +2949,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (name)
- *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+ if (xattr) {
+ xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
- if (value && len) {
rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
&context, &clen);
if (rc)
return rc;
- *value = context;
- *len = clen;
+ xattr->value = context;
+ xattr->value_len = clen;
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 12a45e61c1a5..53e32cde09fb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -962,26 +962,28 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
* @inode: the newly created inode
* @dir: containing directory object
* @qstr: unused
- * @name: where to put the attribute name
- * @value: where to put the attribute value
- * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
+ * @xattrs: where to put the attribute
+ * @base_slot: where to start to write in @xattrs
+ * @fs_data: unused
*
* Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
*/
static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
- void **value, size_t *len)
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot,
+ void *fs_data)
{
struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+ struct xattr *xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs, base_slot,
+ *base_slot + 1);
int may;
- if (name)
- *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
+ if (xattr) {
+ xattr->name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
- if (value && len) {
rcu_read_lock();
may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
&skp->smk_rules);
@@ -999,11 +1001,11 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
}
- *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
- if (*value == NULL)
+ xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (xattr->value == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
+ xattr->value_len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
}
return 0;
--
2.25.1
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