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Message-ID: <CALCETrVHUP9=2kX3aJJugcagsf26W0sLEPsDvVCZNnBmbWrOLQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 08:14:37 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
"linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 7:57 AM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 7:52 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 7:48 AM David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Yu-cheng Yu
> > > > Sent: 27 April 2021 21:47
> > > >
> > > > Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
> > > > return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and
> > > > IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
> > > ...
> > >
> > > Does this feature require that 'binary blobs' for out of tree drivers
> > > be compiled by a version of gcc that adds the ENDBRA instructions?
> > >
> > > If enabled for userspace, what happens if an old .so is dynamically
> > > loaded?
>
> CET will be disabled by ld.so in this case.
What if a program starts a thread and then dlopens a legacy .so?
>
> > > Or do all userspace programs and libraries have to have been compiled
> > > with the ENDBRA instructions?
>
> Correct. ld and ld.so check this.
>
> > If you believe that the userspace tooling for the legacy IBT table
> > actually works, then it should just work. Yu-cheng, etc: how well
> > tested is it?
> >
>
> Legacy IBT bitmap isn't unused since it doesn't cover legacy codes
> generated by legacy JITs.
>
How does ld.so decide whether a legacy JIT is in use?
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