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Date:   Mon, 3 May 2021 13:25:45 -0700
From:   "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle
 signals for shadow stack)

On 5/3/2021 8:29 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
>> On May 3, 2021, at 8:14 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 5/2/2021 4:23 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:47 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>>>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>>>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>>>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>>>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>>>>>>> extensions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>>>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>>>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>>>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>>>>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I still don't like this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>>>>>>
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>>>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
>>>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>>>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
>>>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>>>
>>>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>>>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
>>> Wait, what's the actual shadow stack token format?  And is the token
>>> on the new stack or the old stack when sigaltstack is in use?  For
>>> that matter, is there any support for an alternate shadow stack for
>>> signals?
>>
>> The restore token is a pointer pointing directly above itself and bit[0] indicates 64-bit mode.
>>
>> Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, there is no alternate shadow stack.  However, the application can allocate and switch to a new shadow stack.
> 
> I think we should make the ABI support an alternate shadow stack even if we don’t implement it initially. After all, some day someone might want to register a handler for shadow stack overflow.
> 

Agree.  We can probably add something in parallel of sigaltstack(), and 
let the user choose separately alternate normal/shadow stacks.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

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