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Message-ID: <CAHk-=whCMLJB4FafaqHOrpE0UOLkq5Wc4EyNSJLzq3NZAwN0-w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 13:24:55 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Arusekk <arek_koz@...pl>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] proc: Use seq_read_iter for /proc/*/maps
On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 1:21 PM Arusekk <arek_koz@...pl> wrote:
>
> Keeping it the way it is for the sake of security of userspace applications
> looks more like security through obscurity to me.
No, it's simply "no valid use" and "why expose interfaces that don't
need to be exposed".
splice() _has_ been a security issue before. It's why I want to limit
it now. I want to enable it only for cases that seem to be worth
enabling for.
Have we fixed all the splice security issues? I certainly hope so. Are
you correct in stating that there are probably other places that might
be more interesting to attackers? Sure. But none of that changes the
basic issue: why expose this?
Linus
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