linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 03/15] KVM: SVM: Inject #UD on RDTSCP when it should be disabled in the guest

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <YJHGQgEE3mqUhbAc@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 4 May 2021 22:10:10 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
        Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/15] KVM: SVM: Inject #UD on RDTSCP when it should be
 disabled in the guest

On Tue, May 04, 2021, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 2:53 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, May 04, 2021, Jim Mattson wrote:
> > > On Tue, May 4, 2021 at 10:17 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Intercept RDTSCP to inject #UD if RDTSC is disabled in the guest.
> > > >
> > > > Note, SVM does not support intercepting RDPID.  Unlike VMX's
> > > > ENABLE_RDTSCP control, RDTSCP interception does not apply to RDPID.  This
> > > > is a benign virtualization hole as the host kernel (incorrectly) sets
> > > > MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP is supported, and KVM loads the guest's MSR_TSC_AUX
> > > > into hardware if RDTSCP is supported in the host, i.e. KVM will not leak
> > > > the host's MSR_TSC_AUX to the guest.
> > > >
> > > > But, when the kernel bug is fixed, KVM will start leaking the host's
> > > > MSR_TSC_AUX if RDPID is supported in hardware, but RDTSCP isn't available
> > > > for whatever reason.  This leak will be remedied in a future commit.
> > > >
> > > > Fixes: 46896c73c1a4 ("KVM: svm: add support for RDTSCP")
> > > > Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> > > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > > > ---
> > > ...
> > > > @@ -4007,8 +4017,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > > >         svm->nrips_enabled = kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS) &&
> > > >                              guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
> > > >
> > > > -       /* Check again if INVPCID interception if required */
> > > > -       svm_check_invpcid(svm);
> > > > +       svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
> > >
> > > Does the right thing happen here if the vCPU is in guest mode when
> > > userspace decides to toggle the CPUID.80000001H:EDX.RDTSCP bit on or
> > > off?
> >
> > I hate our terminology.  By "guest mode", do you mean running the vCPU, or do
> > you specifically mean running in L2?
> 
> I mean is_guest_mode(vcpu) is true (i.e. running L2).

No, it will not do the right thing, whatever "right thing" even means in this
context.  That's a pre-existing issue, e.g. INVCPID handling is also wrong.
I highly doubt VMX does, or even can, do the right thing either.

I'm pretty sure I lobbied in the past to disallow KVM_SET_CPUID* if the vCPU is
in guest mode since it's impossible to do the right thing without forcing an
exit to L1, e.g. changing MAXPHYSADDR will allow running L2 with an illegal
CR3, ditto for various CR4 bits.