linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation

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Date:   Thu, 6 May 2021 07:57:44 +0000
From:   David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To:     'Linus Torvalds' <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
CC:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        "Waiman Long" <longman@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        "Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess
 speculation

From: Linus Torvalds
> Sent: 05 May 2021 19:32
> 
> On Wed, May 5, 2021 at 1:48 AM David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com> wrote:
> >
> > This would error requests for address 0 earlier - but I don't
> > believe they are ever valid in Linux.
> > (Some historic x86 a.out formats did load to address 0.)
> 
> Not only loading at address 0 - there are various real reason s why
> address 0 might actually be needed.
> 
> Anybody who still runs a 32-bit kernel and wants to use vm86 mode, for
> example, requires address 0 because that's simply how the hardware
> works.
> 
> So no. "mask to zero and make zero invalid" is not a proper model.

I had my doubts.
But letting userspace map address zero has been a security problem.
It can turn a kernel panic into executing 'user' code with
supervisor permissions.

So I did wonder if it had been banned completely.

	David

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