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Message-ID: <92296246-9d24-8d64-3ace-e8a36e595d27@digikod.net>
Date: Fri, 7 May 2021 18:15:44 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: landlock@...ts.linux.dev
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: New mailing list for Landlock LSM user space discussions
Hi,
Here is a new mailing list for application developers to ask questions
about Landlock and collaborate. This mailing list is also a place to
send patches to user space applications (in CC) to support Landlock. The
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org mailing list should still be used
for kernel development though.
You can subscribe or just freely send emails to
landlock@...ts.linux.dev: https://subspace.kernel.org/lists.linux.dev.html
Regards,
Mickaël
On 02/05/2021 04:02, pr-tracker-bot@...nel.org wrote:
> The pull request you sent on Wed, 28 Apr 2021 12:54:22 +1000 (AEST):
>
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git tags/landlock_v34
>
> has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
> https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59
>
> Thank you!
>
On 28/04/2021 04:54, James Morris wrote:
> Hi Linus,
>
> This patchset adds a new LSM called Landlock, from Mickaël Salaün.
>
> Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
>
>>>From Mickaël's cover letter:
>
> The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
> global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a
> stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes
> as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide
> access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the
> security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space
> applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged
> ones, to securely restrict themselves.
>
> Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls
> and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel
> objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic.
> Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU
> Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil.
>
> In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
> This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series
> still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of
> seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems,
> security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2].
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/
>
> The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
>
> See also: https://landlock.io/
>
> This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
> years. The v33 code has been in next since April 9, and was updated last
> week to v34 with a relatively simple change. If you prefer to pull v33
> instead, please pull "tags/landlock_v33" instead, and we'll push the
> change through after merging.
>
> There's a merge conflict in the syscall tables, with resolution by
> Stephen Rothwell:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/20210409143954.22329cfa@canb.auug.org.au/
>
> Al Viro raised some issues re. the VFS in v31:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/YGUslUPwp85Zrp4t@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk/
>
> which were addressed in comments and in v33:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/5f4dfa1-f9ac-f31f-3237-dcf976cabbfc@namei.org/
>
>
> Please pull.
>
> ---
>
> The following changes since commit 1e28eed17697bcf343c6743f0028cc3b5dd88bf0:
>
> Linux 5.12-rc3 (2021-03-14 14:41:02 -0700)
>
> are available in the Git repository at:
>
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git tags/landlock_v34
>
> for you to fetch changes up to 3532b0b4352ce79400b0aa68414f1a0fc422b920:
>
> landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features (2021-04-22 12:22:11 -0700)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Casey Schaufler (1):
> LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
>
> Mickaël Salaün (12):
> landlock: Add object management
> landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
> landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
> landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
> landlock: Support filesystem access-control
> fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
> arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
> landlock: Add syscall implementations
> selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
> samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
> landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
> landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
>
> Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 +
> Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 85 +
> Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 +
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 311 +++
> MAINTAINERS | 15 +
> arch/Kconfig | 7 +
> arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 6 +
> arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 3 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 3 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 3 +
> arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> arch/um/Kconfig | 1 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 3 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 3 +
> arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 3 +
> fs/super.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +
> include/linux/security.h | 4 +
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 7 +
> include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 8 +-
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 137 ++
> kernel/sys_ni.c | 5 +
> samples/Kconfig | 7 +
> samples/Makefile | 1 +
> samples/landlock/.gitignore | 1 +
> samples/landlock/Makefile | 13 +
> samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 238 ++
> security/Kconfig | 11 +-
> security/Makefile | 2 +
> security/landlock/Kconfig | 21 +
> security/landlock/Makefile | 4 +
> security/landlock/common.h | 20 +
> security/landlock/cred.c | 46 +
> security/landlock/cred.h | 58 +
> security/landlock/fs.c | 692 ++++++
> security/landlock/fs.h | 70 +
> security/landlock/limits.h | 21 +
> security/landlock/object.c | 67 +
> security/landlock/object.h | 91 +
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 120 +
> security/landlock/ptrace.h | 14 +
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 473 ++++
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 165 ++
> security/landlock/setup.c | 40 +
> security/landlock/setup.h | 18 +
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 451 ++++
> security/security.c | 51 +-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 +-
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 +
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +-
> security/smack/smack.h | 6 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore | 2 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile | 24 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 266 +++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 183 ++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 7 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 2791 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 337 +++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c | 5 +
> 72 files changed, 6986 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore
> create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile
> create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/limits.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscalls.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c
>
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