[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <202105101508.BC6CC99FAD@keescook>
Date: Mon, 10 May 2021 15:09:12 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: "Saripalli, RK" <rsaripal@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, bsd@...hat.com,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] x86/cpufeatures: Implement Predictive Store
Forwarding control.
On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 11:44:03PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Mon, May 10 2021 at 06:10, RK Saripalli wrote:
> > On 5/7/2021 10:13 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> >> What's wrong with just treating this in the same way in which we treat
> >> all other speculative vulnerabilities and provide a consistent picture
> >> to the user?
> >>
> >> Something like the below. You get the idea.
> >
> > Thomas, thank you very much for the comments.
> >
> > I provided the links to the original patches which treat PSF similar to other
> > speculative vulnerabilities.
> >
> > Could you review them please?. The first patch is the cover letter.
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-1-rsaripal@amd.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-2-rsaripal@amd.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-3-rsaripal@amd.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-4-rsaripal@amd.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-5-rsaripal@amd.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210406155004.230790-6-rsaripal@amd.com/
>
> They are going into the right direction, i.e. detection and reporting.
>
> Vs. mitigation control the question is whether we need the full
> machinery of prctl/seccomp and so forth especially under the aspect that
> the SSBD mitigation already covers the PSF issue.
>
> So for the start a simple on/off might be good enough.
>
> Kees, any opinions?
I agree: if PSF is a subset of SSBD, there's no need for the additional
machinery.
On a related topic, what happened to Andi's patch to switch the seccomp
defaults? I can't find it now...
--
Kees Cook
Powered by blists - more mailing lists