linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW

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Message-ID: <20210511114852.5wm6a5z72xjlqc4c@box>
Date:   Tue, 11 May 2021 14:48:52 +0300
From:   "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow
 stack

On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:43:15PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
> an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap() and
> mprotect().  Each has its advantages and compromises.
> 
> An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive.  However, the existing x86
> arch_prctl() takes only two parameters.  Multiple parameters must be
> passed in a memory buffer.  There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
> registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
> 
> A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
> work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
> mmap()/mprotect().
> 
> The introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage
> of existing APIs.  The x86-specific PROT_SHADOW_STACK is translated to
> VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing
> the wheel.  There are potential pitfalls though.  The most obvious one
> would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection.  However, the
> attacker would have to get to the syscall first.
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> v26:
> - Change PROT_SHSTK to PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
> - Remove (vm_flags & VM_SHARED) check, since it is covered by
>   !vma_is_anonymous().
> 
> v24:
> - Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to
>   arch_validate_prot().
> - Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to
>   arch_validate_flags().
> - Add arch_validate_flags().
> 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h      | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h |  2 ++
>  include/linux/mm.h               |  1 +
>  3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
> index 629f6c81263a..fbb90f1b02c0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
> @@ -20,11 +20,69 @@
>  		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
>  		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
>  
> -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (		\
> +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (			\
>  		((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |      \
>  		((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |      \
>  		((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |      \
>  		((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
> +#else
> +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
>  #endif
>  
> +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
> +						   unsigned long pkey)
> +{
> +	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
> +
> +	if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK)
> +		vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK;
> +
> +	return vm_prot_bits;
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> +static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +	unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM |
> +			      PROT_SHADOW_STACK;
> +
> +	if (prot & ~valid)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK) {
> +		if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size)
> +			return false;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
> +		 * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
> +		 * instructions).  PROT_SHADOW_STACK and PROT_WRITE are
> +		 * mutually exclusive.
> +		 */
> +		if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
> +			return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
> +
> +static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Shadow stack must be anonymous and not shared.
> +	 */
> +	if ((vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
> +
>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> index f28fa4acaeaf..4c36b263cf0a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
> @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
>  
>  #define MAP_32BIT	0x40		/* only give out 32bit addresses */
>  
> +#define PROT_SHADOW_STACK	0x10	/* shadow stack pages */
> +
>  #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
>  
>  #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 1ccec5cc399b..9a7652eea207 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
>  
>  #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
>  # define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
> +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR	VM_SHADOW_STACK

Nit: you can put VM_SHADOW_STACK directly into VM_FLAGS_CLEAR. It's
already conditinal on the feature enabled and VM_NONE otherwise.

Up to you.

Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov