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Message-ID: <821fa66abf8b05f78eb4d25d4b260e3ded887536.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 12:08:24 -0700
From: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@...gle.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@...com>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 0/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to
create "secret" memory areas
On Thu, 2021-05-13 at 21:47 +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
>
> Hi,
>
> @Andrew, this is based on v5.13-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you
> prefer.
>
> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file
> descriptor.
>
> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for
> the
> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The
> mmap()
> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a
> "secret"
> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not
> present in
> the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the
> owning mm.
>
> Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other
> users,
> such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile
> tenant is
> trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants
> mappings.
>
> It's designed to provide the following protections:
>
> * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel
> attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes
> "simple"
> ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the
> required
> complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the
> kernel
> stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make
> finding
> gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for
> accessing
> secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the
> only
> way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping
> entry,
> the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE
> pointing to
> it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least
> three
> gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks.
>
> * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the
> secret
> memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
> kernel to
> be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via
> the
> direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.
>
> * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access
> secretmem, a
> kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and
> create new
> ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets
> exfiltration using ptrace.
>
> In the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect
> guest memory
> in a virtual machine host.
>
> For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace
> library
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git
>
> that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to
> redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any
> secret
> keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does
> is
> expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of
> the
> use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with
> secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to
> give
> them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the
> toolkits without any need for user application modification.
>
> Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage
> of
> the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings
> as
> well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration
> callbacks.
>
> The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files,
> to
> implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with
> "native" mm
> ABIs in the future.
>
> Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation
> on
> architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which
> affects
> the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for
> CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "...
> can
> improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736
> ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that
> "...
> although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no
> compelling
> evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to
> have
> secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system
> administrator to
> enable it at boot time.
>
> In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of
> the
> direct map.
>
> [1]
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/
>
> v19:
> * block /dev/mem mmap access, per David
> * disallow mmap/mprotect with PROT_EXEC, per Kees
> * simplify return in page_is_secretmem(), per Matthew
> * use unsigned int for syscall falgs, per Yury
>
> v18:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210303162209.8609-1-rppt@kernel.org
> * rebase on v5.12-rc1
> * merge kfence fix into the original patch
> * massage commit message of the patch introducing the memfd_secret
> syscall
>
> v17:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210208084920.2884-1-rppt@kernel.org
> * Remove pool of large pages backing secretmem allocations, per
> Michal Hocko
> * Add secretmem pages to unevictable LRU, per Michal Hocko
> * Use GFP_HIGHUSER as secretmem mapping mask, per Michal Hocko
> * Make secretmem an opt-in feature that is disabled by default
>
> v16:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-1-rppt@kernel.org
> * Fix memory leak intorduced in v15
> * Clean the data left from previous page user before handing the page
> to
> the userspace
>
> v15:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210120180612.1058-1-rppt@kernel.org
> * Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu
> builds (patch 3)
> * Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments
> (patches 6,7)
> * Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems
>
> Older history:
> v14:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v13:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201201074559.27742-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v12:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v11:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124092556.12009-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v10:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v9:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201117162932.13649-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v8:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201110151444.20662-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v7:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201026083752.13267-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v6:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v5:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200916073539.3552-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v4:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v3:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v2:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org
> v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org
> rfc-v2:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/
> rfc-v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/
> rfc-v0:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1572171452-7958-1-git-send-email-rppt@kernel.org/
>
> Mike Rapoport (8):
> mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
> riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
> set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
> set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually
> enabled
> mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory
> areas
> PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
> arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
> secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
>
> arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 -
> arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 -
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 ++
> arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
> arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 +
> arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +-
> arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +-
> arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 +-
> arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +-
> arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
> arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +-
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +-
> arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +-
> drivers/char/mem.c | 4 +
> include/linux/secretmem.h | 54 ++++
> include/linux/set_memory.h | 16 +-
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +-
> include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
> kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +-
> kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +-
> kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 +
> mm/Kconfig | 4 +
> mm/Makefile | 1 +
> mm/gup.c | 12 +
> mm/internal.h | 3 +
> mm/mlock.c | 3 +-
> mm/mmap.c | 5 +-
> mm/secretmem.c | 254 +++++++++++++++++++
> mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +-
> scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 +
> tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296
> ++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++
> 38 files changed, 744 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
> create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h
> create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
>
>
> base-commit: 6efb943b8616ec53a5e444193dccf1af9ad627b5
For the series:
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
James
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