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Message-ID: <CACycT3v-2naEaXEtPqaKcGz8qpfnmp4VzrHefqLNhO=9=57jdQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 14:06:38 +0800
From: Yongji Xie <xieyongji@...edance.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@...hat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, file@...t.tu-berlin.de,
ashish.kalra@....com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH V2 0/7] Do not read from descripto ring
On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 12:27 AM Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 23, 2021 at 04:09:35PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > Sometimes, the driver doesn't trust the device. This is usually
> > happens for the encrtpyed VM or VDUSE[1].
>
> Thanks for doing this.
>
> Can you describe the overall memory safety model that virtio drivers
> must follow? For example:
>
> - Driver-to-device buffers must be on dedicated pages to avoid
> information leaks.
>
> - Driver-to-device buffers must be on dedicated pages to avoid memory
> corruption.
>
> When I say "pages" I guess it's the IOMMU page size that matters?
>
> What is the memory access granularity of VDUSE?
>
Now we use PAGE_SIZE as the access granularity. I think it should be
safe to access the Driver-to-device buffers in VDUSE case because we
also use bounce-buffering mechanism like swiotlb does.
Thanks,
Yongji
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