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Message-ID: <3f392477-12b9-ff16-8e32-b00b6593d82a@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 15:31:48 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan"
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2-fix 1/1] x86/tdx: Make DMA pages shared
On 5/18/21 3:12 PM, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> "TDX is similar. In TDX architecture, the private guest memory is
> encrypted, which prevents anything other than guest from
> accessing/modifying it. So to communicate with I/O devices, we need
> to create decrypted mapping and make the pages shared."
That's actually even more wrong. :(
Check out "Machine Check Architecture Background" in the TDX
architecture spec.
Modification is totally permitted in the architecture. A host can write
all day long to guest memory. Depending on how you use the word,
"access" can also include writes.
TDX really just prevents guests from *consuming* the gunk that an
attacker might write.
Also, don't say "decrypted". The memory is probably still TME-enabled
and probably encrypted on the DIMM. It's still encrypted even if
shared, it's just using the TME key, not the TD key.
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