| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20210521103150.GB24442@kadam>
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 13:31:50 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
To: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@...sung.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-cifsd-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, smfrench@...il.com,
senozhatsky@...omium.org, hyc.lee@...il.com,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, hch@....de, hch@...radead.org,
ronniesahlberg@...il.com, aurelien.aptel@...il.com,
aaptel@...e.com, sandeen@...deen.net, willy@...radead.org,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Steve French <stfrench@...rosoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 04/10] cifsd: add authentication
Didn't someone complain that we already had enough asn1 code in lib
and shouldn't add this in the subsystem dir?
Mostly trivial stuff. It's still not checkpatch --strict clean. I only
noticed the "CHECK: Alignment should match open parenthesis" while
reviewing so the rest of the warnings are apparently something I don't
care about. ;) The reason why I really like the alignment to be match
the open parenthesis is because then it doesn't line up with the code.
Generally, I want the success patch indented one tab and the failure
path indented two tabs.
> + rc = generate_key(sess, signing->label, signing->context, key,
> + SMB3_SIGN_KEY_SIZE);
Here the SMB3_SIGN_KEY_SIZE is aligned at two tabs. It slightly slows
me down when I see code like that which isn't aligned where I expect it.
It's the same for if statements and four statements, if you align it
with the open parenthesis then it's easy to see what is part of the
condition and what is inside because they are indented differently.
Bad:
if (condition &&
condition2)
frob();
Good:
if (condition &&
condition2)
frob();
I noticed a couple error code bugs where we return 1 on failure like in
ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(). Some buffer overflows with smb_strtoUTF16() and
UNICODE_LEN().
On Fri, May 21, 2021 at 03:26:31PM +0900, Namjae Jeon wrote:
> This adds NTLM/NTLMv2/Kerberos authentications and signing/encryption.
>
> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@...sung.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@...il.com>
> Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@...rosoft.com>
> ---
> fs/cifsd/asn1.c | 352 ++++++++
> fs/cifsd/asn1.h | 29 +
> fs/cifsd/auth.c | 1344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> fs/cifsd/auth.h | 90 ++
> fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.c | 286 ++++++
> fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.h | 77 ++
> fs/cifsd/ntlmssp.h | 169 ++++
> fs/cifsd/spnego_negtokeninit.asn1 | 43 +
> fs/cifsd/spnego_negtokentarg.asn1 | 19 +
> 9 files changed, 2409 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/asn1.c
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/asn1.h
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/auth.c
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/auth.h
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.c
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.h
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/ntlmssp.h
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/spnego_negtokeninit.asn1
> create mode 100644 fs/cifsd/spnego_negtokentarg.asn1
>
> diff --git a/fs/cifsd/asn1.c b/fs/cifsd/asn1.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..aa6ea855c422
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/cifsd/asn1.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * The ASB.1/BER parsing code is derived from ip_nat_snmp_basic.c which was in
> + * turn derived from the gxsnmp package by Gregory McLean & Jochen Friedrich
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2000 RP Internet (http://www.rpi.net.au ).
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
> +
> +#include "glob.h"
> +
> +#include "asn1.h"
> +#include "connection.h"
> +#include "auth.h"
> +#include "spnego_negtokeninit.asn1.h"
> +#include "spnego_negtokentarg.asn1.h"
> +
> +#define SPNEGO_OID_LEN 7
> +#define NTLMSSP_OID_LEN 10
> +#define KRB5_OID_LEN 7
> +#define KRB5U2U_OID_LEN 8
> +#define MSKRB5_OID_LEN 7
> +static unsigned long SPNEGO_OID[7] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 2 };
> +static unsigned long NTLMSSP_OID[10] = { 1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 2, 2, 10 };
> +static unsigned long KRB5_OID[7] = { 1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2 };
> +static unsigned long KRB5U2U_OID[8] = { 1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2, 3 };
> +static unsigned long MSKRB5_OID[7] = { 1, 2, 840, 48018, 1, 2, 2 };
> +
> +static char NTLMSSP_OID_STR[NTLMSSP_OID_LEN] = { 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01,
> + 0x82, 0x37, 0x02, 0x02, 0x0a };
> +
> +static bool
> +asn1_subid_decode(const unsigned char **begin, const unsigned char *end,
> + unsigned long *subid)
> +{
> + const unsigned char *ptr = *begin;
> + unsigned char ch;
> +
> + *subid = 0;
> +
> + do {
> + if (ptr >= end)
> + return false;
> +
> + ch = *ptr++;
> + *subid <<= 7;
> + *subid |= ch & 0x7F;
> + } while ((ch & 0x80) == 0x80);
> +
> + *begin = ptr;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool asn1_oid_decode(const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen,
> + unsigned long **oid, size_t *oidlen)
> +{
> + const unsigned char *iptr = value, *end = value + vlen;
> + unsigned long *optr;
> + unsigned long subid;
> +
> + vlen += 1;
> + if (vlen < 2 || vlen > UINT_MAX/sizeof(unsigned long))
> + return false;
> +
> + *oid = kmalloc(vlen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!*oid)
> + return false;
> +
> + optr = *oid;
> +
> + if (!asn1_subid_decode(&iptr, end, &subid)) {
> + kfree(*oid);
> + *oid = NULL;
> + return false;
> + }
Make this goto fail;
> +
> + if (subid < 40) {
> + optr[0] = 0;
> + optr[1] = subid;
> + } else if (subid < 80) {
> + optr[0] = 1;
> + optr[1] = subid - 40;
> + } else {
> + optr[0] = 2;
> + optr[1] = subid - 80;
> + }
> +
> + *oidlen = 2;
> + optr += 2;
> +
> + while (iptr < end) {
> + if (++(*oidlen) > vlen) {
> + kfree(*oid);
> + *oid = NULL;
> + return false;
goto fail;
> + }
> +
> + if (!asn1_subid_decode(&iptr, end, optr++)) {
> + kfree(*oid);
> + *oid = NULL;
> + return false;
goto fail;
> + }
> + }
> + return true;
fail:
kfree(*oid);
*oid = NULL;
return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool
> +oid_eq(unsigned long *oid1, unsigned int oid1len,
> + unsigned long *oid2, unsigned int oid2len)
> +{
> + unsigned int i;
> +
> + if (oid1len != oid2len)
> + return false;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < oid1len; i++) {
> + if (oid1[i] != oid2[i])
> + return false;
> + }
return memcmp(oid1, oid2, oid1len) == 0;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +int
> +ksmbd_decode_negTokenInit(unsigned char *security_blob, int length,
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
> +{
> + return asn1_ber_decoder(&spnego_negtokeninit_decoder, conn,
> + security_blob, length);
> +}
> +
> +int
> +ksmbd_decode_negTokenTarg(unsigned char *security_blob, int length,
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
> +{
> + return asn1_ber_decoder(&spnego_negtokentarg_decoder, conn,
> + security_blob, length);
> +}
> +
> +static int compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(int len)
> +{
> + if (len > 0xFFFFFF)
> + return 4;
> + else if (len > 0xFFFF)
> + return 3;
> + else if (len > 0xFF)
> + return 2;
> + else if (len > 0x7F)
> + return 1;
> + else
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void encode_asn_tag(char *buf,
> + unsigned int *ofs,
> + char tag,
> + char seq,
> + int length)
> +{
> + int i;
> + int index = *ofs;
> + char hdr_len = compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(length);
> + int len = length + 2 + hdr_len;
> +
> + /* insert tag */
> + buf[index++] = tag;
> +
> + if (!hdr_len)
> + buf[index++] = len;
> + else {
> + buf[index++] = 0x80 | hdr_len;
> + for (i = hdr_len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
> + buf[index++] = (len >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF;
> + }
> +
> + /* insert seq */
> + len = len - (index - *ofs);
> + buf[index++] = seq;
> +
> + if (!hdr_len)
> + buf[index++] = len;
> + else {
> + buf[index++] = 0x80 | hdr_len;
> + for (i = hdr_len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
> + buf[index++] = (len >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF;
> + }
> +
> + *ofs += (index - *ofs);
> +}
> +
> +int build_spnego_ntlmssp_neg_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer, u16 *buflen,
> + char *ntlm_blob, int ntlm_blob_len)
> +{
> + char *buf;
> + unsigned int ofs = 0;
> + int neg_result_len = 4 + compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(1) * 2 + 1;
> + int oid_len = 4 + compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(NTLMSSP_OID_LEN) * 2 +
> + NTLMSSP_OID_LEN;
> + int ntlmssp_len = 4 + compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(ntlm_blob_len) * 2 +
> + ntlm_blob_len;
> + int total_len = 4 + compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(neg_result_len +
> + oid_len + ntlmssp_len) * 2 +
> + neg_result_len + oid_len + ntlmssp_len;
> +
> + buf = kmalloc(total_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!buf)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /* insert main gss header */
> + encode_asn_tag(buf, &ofs, 0xa1, 0x30, neg_result_len + oid_len +
> + ntlmssp_len);
> +
> + /* insert neg result */
> + encode_asn_tag(buf, &ofs, 0xa0, 0x0a, 1);
> + buf[ofs++] = 1;
> +
> + /* insert oid */
> + encode_asn_tag(buf, &ofs, 0xa1, 0x06, NTLMSSP_OID_LEN);
> + memcpy(buf + ofs, NTLMSSP_OID_STR, NTLMSSP_OID_LEN);
> + ofs += NTLMSSP_OID_LEN;
> +
> + /* insert response token - ntlmssp blob */
> + encode_asn_tag(buf, &ofs, 0xa2, 0x04, ntlm_blob_len);
> + memcpy(buf + ofs, ntlm_blob, ntlm_blob_len);
> + ofs += ntlm_blob_len;
> +
> + *pbuffer = buf;
> + *buflen = total_len;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int build_spnego_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer, u16 *buflen,
> + int neg_result)
> +{
> + char *buf;
> + unsigned int ofs = 0;
> + int neg_result_len = 4 + compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(1) * 2 + 1;
> + int total_len = 4 + compute_asn_hdr_len_bytes(neg_result_len) * 2 +
> + neg_result_len;
> +
> + buf = kmalloc(total_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!buf)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /* insert main gss header */
> + encode_asn_tag(buf, &ofs, 0xa1, 0x30, neg_result_len);
> +
> + /* insert neg result */
> + encode_asn_tag(buf, &ofs, 0xa0, 0x0a, 1);
> + if (neg_result)
> + buf[ofs++] = 2;
> + else
> + buf[ofs++] = 0;
> +
> + *pbuffer = buf;
> + *buflen = total_len;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int gssapi_this_mech(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> + unsigned char tag, const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + unsigned long *oid;
> + size_t oidlen;
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + if (!asn1_oid_decode(value, vlen, &oid, &oidlen)) {
> + err = -EBADMSG;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (!oid_eq(oid, oidlen, SPNEGO_OID, SPNEGO_OID_LEN))
> + err = -EBADMSG;
> + kfree(oid);
> +out:
> + if (err) {
> + char buf[50];
> +
> + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Unexpected OID: %s\n", buf);
> + }
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +int neg_token_init_mech_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> + unsigned char tag, const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn = context;
> + unsigned long *oid;
> + size_t oidlen;
> + int mech_type;
> +
> + if (!asn1_oid_decode(value, vlen, &oid, &oidlen)) {
> + char buf[50];
> +
> + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Unexpected OID: %s\n", buf);
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + }
> +
> + if (oid_eq(oid, oidlen, NTLMSSP_OID, NTLMSSP_OID_LEN))
> + mech_type = KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP;
> + else if (oid_eq(oid, oidlen, MSKRB5_OID, MSKRB5_OID_LEN))
> + mech_type = KSMBD_AUTH_MSKRB5;
> + else if (oid_eq(oid, oidlen, KRB5_OID, KRB5_OID_LEN))
> + mech_type = KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5;
> + else if (oid_eq(oid, oidlen, KRB5U2U_OID, KRB5U2U_OID_LEN))
> + mech_type = KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5U2U;
> + else
> + goto out;
Should this be an error path?
> +
> + conn->auth_mechs |= mech_type;
> + if (conn->preferred_auth_mech == 0)
> + conn->preferred_auth_mech = mech_type;
> +
> +out:
> + kfree(oid);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int neg_token_init_mech_token(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> + unsigned char tag, const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn = context;
> +
> + conn->mechToken = kmalloc(vlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!conn->mechToken)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + memcpy(conn->mechToken, value, vlen);
> + conn->mechToken[vlen] = '\0';
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int neg_token_targ_resp_token(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> + unsigned char tag, const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn = context;
> +
> + conn->mechToken = kmalloc(vlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!conn->mechToken)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + memcpy(conn->mechToken, value, vlen);
> + conn->mechToken[vlen] = '\0';
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/fs/cifsd/asn1.h b/fs/cifsd/asn1.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..ff2692b502d6
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/cifsd/asn1.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
> +/*
> + * The ASB.1/BER parsing code is derived from ip_nat_snmp_basic.c which was in
> + * turn derived from the gxsnmp package by Gregory McLean & Jochen Friedrich
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2000 RP Internet (http://www.rpi.net.au ).
> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __ASN1_H__
> +#define __ASN1_H__
> +
> +int ksmbd_decode_negTokenInit(unsigned char *security_blob,
> + int length,
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
> +
> +int ksmbd_decode_negTokenTarg(unsigned char *security_blob,
> + int length,
> + struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
> +
> +int build_spnego_ntlmssp_neg_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
> + u16 *buflen,
> + char *ntlm_blob,
> + int ntlm_blob_len);
> +
> +int build_spnego_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
> + u16 *buflen,
> + int neg_result);
> +#endif /* __ASN1_H__ */
> diff --git a/fs/cifsd/auth.c b/fs/cifsd/auth.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..6b90aac86fcc
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/cifsd/auth.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1344 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2016 Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...nel.org>
> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
> +#include <linux/writeback.h>
> +#include <linux/uio.h>
> +#include <linux/xattr.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +
> +#include "auth.h"
> +#include "glob.h"
> +
> +#include <linux/fips.h>
> +#include <crypto/des.h>
> +
> +#include "server.h"
> +#include "smb_common.h"
> +#include "connection.h"
> +#include "mgmt/user_session.h"
> +#include "mgmt/user_config.h"
> +#include "crypto_ctx.h"
> +#include "transport_ipc.h"
> +#include "buffer_pool.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * Fixed format data defining GSS header and fixed string
> + * "not_defined_in_RFC4178@...ase_ignore".
> + * So sec blob data in neg phase could be generated statically.
> + */
> +static char NEGOTIATE_GSS_HEADER[AUTH_GSS_LENGTH] = {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_KERBEROS5
> + 0x60, 0x5e, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05,
> + 0x05, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x54, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa0, 0x24,
> + 0x30, 0x22, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
> + 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a,
> + 0x86, 0x48, 0x82, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02,
> + 0x06, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x82,
> + 0x37, 0x02, 0x02, 0x0a, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x28,
> + 0xa0, 0x26, 0x1b, 0x24, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x5f,
> + 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x64, 0x5f,
> + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x5f, 0x52, 0x46, 0x43, 0x34, 0x31,
> + 0x37, 0x38, 0x40, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x61, 0x73,
> + 0x65, 0x5f, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65
> +#else
> + 0x60, 0x48, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05,
> + 0x05, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x3e, 0x30, 0x3c, 0xa0, 0x0e,
> + 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04,
> + 0x01, 0x82, 0x37, 0x02, 0x02, 0x0a, 0xa3, 0x2a,
> + 0x30, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x26, 0x1b, 0x24, 0x6e, 0x6f,
> + 0x74, 0x5f, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x65,
> + 0x64, 0x5f, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x5f, 0x52, 0x46, 0x43,
> + 0x34, 0x31, 0x37, 0x38, 0x40, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65,
> + 0x61, 0x73, 0x65, 0x5f, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x6f,
> + 0x72, 0x65
> +#endif
> +};
> +
> +void ksmbd_copy_gss_neg_header(void *buf)
> +{
> + memcpy(buf, NEGOTIATE_GSS_HEADER, AUTH_GSS_LENGTH);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +str_to_key(unsigned char *str, unsigned char *key)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + key[0] = str[0] >> 1;
> + key[1] = ((str[0] & 0x01) << 6) | (str[1] >> 2);
> + key[2] = ((str[1] & 0x03) << 5) | (str[2] >> 3);
> + key[3] = ((str[2] & 0x07) << 4) | (str[3] >> 4);
> + key[4] = ((str[3] & 0x0F) << 3) | (str[4] >> 5);
> + key[5] = ((str[4] & 0x1F) << 2) | (str[5] >> 6);
> + key[6] = ((str[5] & 0x3F) << 1) | (str[6] >> 7);
> + key[7] = str[6] & 0x7F;
> + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
> + key[i] = (key[i] << 1);
> +}
> +
> +static int
> +smbhash(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *key)
> +{
> + unsigned char key2[8];
> + struct des_ctx ctx;
> +
> + str_to_key(key, key2);
> +
> + if (fips_enabled) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH,
> + "FIPS compliance enabled: DES not permitted\n");
> + return -ENOENT;
> + }
Move this check before the str_to_key().
> +
> + des_expand_key(&ctx, key2, DES_KEY_SIZE);
> + des_encrypt(&ctx, out, in);
> + memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int ksmbd_enc_p24(unsigned char *p21, const unsigned char *c8, unsigned char *p24)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = smbhash(p24, c8, p21);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + rc = smbhash(p24 + 8, c8, p21 + 7);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + rc = smbhash(p24 + 16, c8, p21 + 14);
> + return rc;
return smbhash(p24 + 16, c8, p21 + 14);
> +}
> +
> +/* produce a md4 message digest from data of length n bytes */
> +static int ksmbd_enc_md4(unsigned char *md4_hash, unsigned char *link_str,
> + int link_len)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_md4();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Crypto md4 allocation error\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
It feels like "allocation error" is misleading. Or maybe return
-ENOMEM? It's done consistently for all the ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_
calls, though...
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_MD4(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not init md4 shash\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_MD4(ctx), link_str, link_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with link_str\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_MD4(ctx), md4_hash);
> + if (rc)
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate md4 hash\n");
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int ksmbd_enc_update_sess_key(unsigned char *md5_hash, char *nonce,
> + char *server_challenge, int len)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_md5();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Crypto md5 allocation error\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_MD5(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not init md5 shash\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_MD5(ctx), server_challenge, len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with challenge\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_MD5(ctx), nonce, len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with nonce\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_MD5(ctx), md5_hash);
> + if (rc)
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate md5 hash\n");
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_gen_sess_key() - function to generate session key
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + * @hash: source hash value to be used for find session key
> + * @hmac: source hmac value to be used for finding session key
> + *
> + */
> +static int ksmbd_gen_sess_key(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *hash,
> + char *hmac)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> + int rc = -EINVAL;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5();
> + if (!ctx)
> + goto out;
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(CRYPTO_HMACMD5_TFM(ctx),
> + hash,
> + CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "hmacmd5 set key fail error %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not init hmacmd5 error %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx),
> + hmac,
> + SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with response error %d\n",
> + rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx), sess->sess_key);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate hmacmd5 hash error %d\n",
> + rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *ntlmv2_hash,
> + char *dname)
> +{
> + int ret = -EINVAL, len;
> + wchar_t *domain = NULL;
> + __le16 *uniname = NULL;
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(CRYPTO_HMACMD5_TFM(ctx),
> + user_passkey(sess->user),
> + CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
> + if (ret) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not set NT Hash as a key\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx));
> + if (ret) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not init hmacmd5\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* convert user_name to unicode */
> + len = strlen(user_name(sess->user));
> + uniname = kzalloc(2 + UNICODE_LEN(len), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!uniname) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (len) {
> + len = smb_strtoUTF16(uniname, user_name(sess->user), len,
> + sess->conn->local_nls);
> + UniStrupr(uniname);
> + }
> +
> + ret = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx),
> + (char *)uniname,
> + UNICODE_LEN(len));
len = smb_strtoUTF16() modifies len so UNICODE_LEN() multiplies it by
two and leads to a read overflow.
> + if (ret) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with user\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* Convert domain name or conn name to unicode and uppercase */
> + len = strlen(dname);
> + domain = kzalloc(2 + UNICODE_LEN(len), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!domain) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + len = smb_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, dname, len,
> + sess->conn->local_nls);
> +
> + ret = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx),
> + (char *)domain,
> + UNICODE_LEN(len));
The UNICODE_LEN() leads to a buffer overflow.
> + if (ret) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with domain\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx), ntlmv2_hash);
> +out:
> + if (ret)
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate md5 hash\n");
I think the if (ret) was intended to go before the out: label.
> + kfree(uniname);
> + kfree(domain);
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_auth_ntlm() - NTLM authentication handler
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + * @pw_buf: NTLM challenge response
> + * @passkey: user password
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, error number on error
> + */
> +int ksmbd_auth_ntlm(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *pw_buf)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + unsigned char p21[21];
> + char key[CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE];
> +
> + memset(p21, '\0', 21);
> + memcpy(p21, user_passkey(sess->user), CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
> + rc = ksmbd_enc_p24(p21, sess->ntlmssp.cryptkey, key);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_err("password processing failed\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + ksmbd_enc_md4(sess->sess_key,
> + user_passkey(sess->user),
> + CIFS_SMB1_SESSKEY_SIZE);
> + memcpy(sess->sess_key + CIFS_SMB1_SESSKEY_SIZE, key,
> + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
> + sess->sequence_number = 1;
> +
> + if (strncmp(pw_buf, key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE) != 0) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "ntlmv1 authentication failed\n");
> + rc = -EINVAL;
return -EINVAL;
> + } else {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "ntlmv1 authentication pass\n");
Pull this in one tab.
> + }
> +
> + return rc;
return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() - NTLMv2 authentication handler
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + * @ntlmv2: NTLMv2 challenge response
> + * @blen: NTLMv2 blob length
> + * @domain_name: domain name
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, error number on error
> + */
> +int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_session *sess, struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2,
> + int blen, char *domain_name)
> +{
> + char ntlmv2_hash[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE];
> + char ntlmv2_rsp[CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE];
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> + char *construct = NULL;
> + int rc = -EINVAL, len;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(sess, ntlmv2_hash, domain_name);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(CRYPTO_HMACMD5_TFM(ctx),
> + ntlmv2_hash,
> + CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not init hmacmd5\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + len = CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE + blen;
> + construct = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!construct) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(construct, sess->ntlmssp.cryptkey, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
> + memcpy(construct + CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE,
> + (char *)(&ntlmv2->blob_signature), blen);
No need for this (char *) cast.
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx), construct, len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with response\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx), ntlmv2_rsp);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate md5 hash\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = ksmbd_gen_sess_key(sess, ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate sess key\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = memcmp(ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
if (memcmp() != 0)
rc = -EINVAL;
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + kfree(construct);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * __ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() - NTLM2(extended security) authentication handler
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + * @client_nonce: client nonce from LM response.
> + * @ntlm_resp: ntlm response data from client.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, error number on error
> + */
> +static int __ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *client_nonce,
> + char *ntlm_resp)
> +{
> + char sess_key[CIFS_SMB1_SESSKEY_SIZE] = {0};
> + int rc;
> + unsigned char p21[21];
> + char key[CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE];
> +
> + rc = ksmbd_enc_update_sess_key(sess_key,
> + client_nonce,
> + (char *)sess->ntlmssp.cryptkey, 8);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_err("password processing failed\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + memset(p21, '\0', 21);
> + memcpy(p21, user_passkey(sess->user), CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
> + rc = ksmbd_enc_p24(p21, sess_key, key);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_err("password processing failed\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = memcmp(ntlm_resp, key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
if (memcmp(ntlm_resp, key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE) != 0)
rc = -EINVAL;
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() - helper function to construct
> + * authenticate blob
> + * @authblob: authenticate blob source pointer
> + * @usr: user details
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, error number on error
> + */
> +int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(struct authenticate_message *authblob,
> + int blob_len, struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + char *domain_name;
> + unsigned int lm_off, nt_off;
> + unsigned short nt_len;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (blob_len < sizeof(struct authenticate_message)) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "negotiate blob len %d too small\n",
> + blob_len);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (memcmp(authblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "blob signature incorrect %s\n",
> + authblob->Signature);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + lm_off = le32_to_cpu(authblob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset);
> + nt_off = le32_to_cpu(authblob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset);
> + nt_len = le16_to_cpu(authblob->NtChallengeResponse.Length);
> +
> + /* process NTLM authentication */
> + if (nt_len == CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE) {
> + if (le32_to_cpu(authblob->NegotiateFlags) &
> + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC)
> + return __ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(sess, (char *)authblob +
> + lm_off, (char *)authblob + nt_off);
> + else
> + return ksmbd_auth_ntlm(sess, (char *)authblob +
> + nt_off);
> + }
> +
> + /* TODO : use domain name that imported from configuration file */
> + domain_name = smb_strndup_from_utf16((const char *)authblob +
> + le32_to_cpu(authblob->DomainName.BufferOffset),
> + le16_to_cpu(authblob->DomainName.Length), true,
> + sess->conn->local_nls);
> + if (IS_ERR(domain_name))
> + return PTR_ERR(domain_name);
> +
> + /* process NTLMv2 authentication */
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "decode_ntlmssp_authenticate_blob dname%s\n",
> + domain_name);
> + ret = ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(sess,
> + (struct ntlmv2_resp *)((char *)authblob + nt_off),
> + nt_len - CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE,
> + domain_name);
> + kfree(domain_name);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_neg_blob() - helper function to construct
> + * negotiate blob
> + * @negblob: negotiate blob source pointer
> + * @rsp: response header pointer to be updated
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + *
> + */
> +int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_neg_blob(struct negotiate_message *negblob,
> + int blob_len, struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + if (blob_len < sizeof(struct negotiate_message)) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "negotiate blob len %d too small\n",
> + blob_len);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (memcmp(negblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "blob signature incorrect %s\n",
> + negblob->Signature);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + sess->ntlmssp.client_flags = le32_to_cpu(negblob->NegotiateFlags);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob() - helper function to construct
> + * challenge blob
> + * @chgblob: challenge blob source pointer to initialize
> + * @rsp: response header pointer to be updated
> + * @sess: session of connection
> + *
> + */
> +unsigned int
> +ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob,
> + struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + struct target_info *tinfo;
> + wchar_t *name;
> + __u8 *target_name;
> + unsigned int len, flags, blob_off, blob_len, type, target_info_len = 0;
> + int cflags = sess->ntlmssp.client_flags;
> +
> + memcpy(chgblob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
> + chgblob->MessageType = NtLmChallenge;
> +
> + flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
> + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER |
> + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO;
> +
> + if (cflags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
> + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
> + flags |= cflags & (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 |
> + NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56);
flags |= cflags & (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56);
> + }
> +
> + if (cflags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN)
> + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
> +
> + if (cflags & NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET)
> + flags |= NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
> +
> + if (sess->conn->use_spnego &&
> + (cflags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
> + flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
> +
> + chgblob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
> + len = strlen(ksmbd_netbios_name());
> + name = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!name)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + len = smb_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)name, ksmbd_netbios_name(), len,
> + sess->conn->local_nls);
> + len = UNICODE_LEN(len);
The smb_strtoUTF16() already modifies len so multiplying it by two a
second time leads to a buffer overflow?
> +
> + blob_off = sizeof(struct challenge_message);
> + blob_len = blob_off + len;
> +
> + chgblob->TargetName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
> + chgblob->TargetName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
> + chgblob->TargetName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(blob_off);
> +
> + /* Initialize random conn challenge */
> + get_random_bytes(sess->ntlmssp.cryptkey, sizeof(__u64));
> + memcpy(chgblob->Challenge, sess->ntlmssp.cryptkey,
> + CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
> +
> + /* Add Target Information to security buffer */
> + chgblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(blob_len);
> +
> + target_name = (__u8 *)chgblob + blob_off;
> + memcpy(target_name, name, len);
> + tinfo = (struct target_info *)(target_name + len);
> +
> + chgblob->TargetInfoArray.Length = 0;
> + /* Add target info list for NetBIOS/DNS settings */
> + for (type = NTLMSSP_AV_NB_COMPUTER_NAME;
> + type <= NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME; type++) {
for (type = NTLMSSP_AV_NB_COMPUTER_NAME;
type <= NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME; type++) {
> + tinfo->Type = cpu_to_le16(type);
> + tinfo->Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
> + memcpy(tinfo->Content, name, len);
> + tinfo = (struct target_info *)((char *)tinfo + 4 + len);
> + target_info_len += 4 + len;
> + }
> +
> + /* Add terminator subblock */
> + tinfo->Type = 0;
> + tinfo->Length = 0;
> + target_info_len += 4;
> +
> + chgblob->TargetInfoArray.Length = cpu_to_le16(target_info_len);
> + chgblob->TargetInfoArray.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(target_info_len);
> + blob_len += target_info_len;
> + kfree(name);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "NTLMSSP SecurityBufferLength %d\n", blob_len);
> + return blob_len;
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_KERBEROS5
> +int ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *in_blob,
> + int in_len, char *out_blob, int *out_len)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp;
> + struct ksmbd_user *user = NULL;
> + int retval;
> +
> + resp = ksmbd_ipc_spnego_authen_request(in_blob, in_len);
> + if (!resp) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "SPNEGO_AUTHEN_REQUEST failure\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (!(resp->login_response.status & KSMBD_USER_FLAG_OK)) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "krb5 authentication failure\n");
> + retval = -EPERM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (*out_len <= resp->spnego_blob_len) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "buf len %d, but blob len %d\n",
> + *out_len, resp->spnego_blob_len);
> + retval = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (resp->session_key_len > sizeof(sess->sess_key)) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "session key is too long\n");
> + retval = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + user = ksmbd_alloc_user(&resp->login_response);
> + if (!user) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "login failure\n");
> + retval = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + sess->user = user;
> +
> + memcpy(sess->sess_key, resp->payload, resp->session_key_len);
> + memcpy(out_blob, resp->payload + resp->session_key_len,
> + resp->spnego_blob_len);
> + *out_len = resp->spnego_blob_len;
> + retval = 0;
> +out:
> + kvfree(resp);
> + return retval;
> +}
> +#else
> +int ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *in_blob,
> + int in_len, char *out_blob, int *out_len)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu() - function to generate packet signing
> + * @conn: connection
> + * @key: signing key
> + * @iov: buffer iov array
> + * @n_vec: number of iovecs
> + * @sig: signature value generated for client request packet
> + *
> + */
> +int ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *key, struct kvec *iov,
> + int n_vec, char *sig)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> + int rc = -EINVAL;
> + int i;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacsha256();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256_TFM(ctx),
> + key,
> + SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "hmacsha256 init error %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) {
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx),
> + iov[i].iov_base,
> + iov[i].iov_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "hmacsha256 update error %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx), sig);
> + if (rc)
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "hmacsha256 generation error %d\n", rc);
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu() - function to generate packet signing
> + * @conn: connection
> + * @key: signing key
> + * @iov: buffer iov array
> + * @n_vec: number of iovecs
> + * @sig: signature value generated for client request packet
> + *
> + */
> +int ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *key, struct kvec *iov,
> + int n_vec, char *sig)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> + int rc = -EINVAL;
> + int i;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not crypto alloc cmac rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(CRYPTO_CMACAES_TFM(ctx),
> + key,
> + SMB2_CMACAES_SIZE);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_CMACAES(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "cmaces init error %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) {
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_CMACAES(ctx),
> + iov[i].iov_base,
> + iov[i].iov_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "cmaces update error %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_CMACAES(ctx), sig);
> + if (rc)
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "cmaces generation error %d\n", rc);
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +struct derivation {
> + struct kvec label;
> + struct kvec context;
> + bool binding;
> +};
> +
> +static int generate_key(struct ksmbd_session *sess, struct kvec label,
> + struct kvec context, __u8 *key, unsigned int key_size)
> +{
> + unsigned char zero = 0x0;
> + __u8 i[4] = {0, 0, 0, 1};
> + __u8 L128[4] = {0, 0, 0, 128};
> + __u8 L256[4] = {0, 0, 1, 0};
> + int rc = -EINVAL;
> + unsigned char prfhash[SMB2_HMACSHA256_SIZE];
> + unsigned char *hashptr = prfhash;
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + memset(prfhash, 0x0, SMB2_HMACSHA256_SIZE);
> + memset(key, 0x0, key_size);
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacsha256();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256_TFM(ctx),
> + sess->sess_key,
> + SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc)
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "hmacsha256 init error %d\n", rc);
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx), i, 4);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with n\n");
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx),
> + label.iov_base,
> + label.iov_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with label\n");
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx), &zero, 1);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with zero\n");
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx),
> + context.iov_base,
> + context.iov_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with context\n");
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + if (sess->conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_CCM ||
> + sess->conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx), L256, 4);
> + else
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx), L128, 4);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with L\n");
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_HMACSHA256(ctx), hashptr);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate hmacmd5 hash error %d\n",
> + rc);
> + goto smb3signkey_ret;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(key, hashptr, key_size);
> +
> +smb3signkey_ret:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int generate_smb3signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
> + const struct derivation *signing)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + struct channel *chann;
> + char *key;
> +
> + chann = lookup_chann_list(sess);
> + if (!chann)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (sess->conn->dialect >= SMB30_PROT_ID && signing->binding)
> + key = chann->smb3signingkey;
> + else
> + key = sess->smb3signingkey;
> +
> + rc = generate_key(sess, signing->label, signing->context, key,
> + SMB3_SIGN_KEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (!(sess->conn->dialect >= SMB30_PROT_ID && signing->binding))
> + memcpy(chann->smb3signingkey, key, SMB3_SIGN_KEY_SIZE);
> +
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "dumping generated AES signing keys\n");
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Session Id %llu\n", sess->id);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Session Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE, sess->sess_key);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Signing Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB3_SIGN_KEY_SIZE, key);
> + return rc;
return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb30_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + struct derivation d;
> +
> + d.label.iov_base = "SMB2AESCMAC";
> + d.label.iov_len = 12;
> + d.context.iov_base = "SmbSign";
> + d.context.iov_len = 8;
> + d.binding = false;
> +
> + return generate_smb3signingkey(sess, &d);
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb311_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + struct derivation d;
> +
> + d.label.iov_base = "SMBSigningKey";
> + d.label.iov_len = 14;
> + d.context.iov_base = sess->Preauth_HashValue;
> + d.context.iov_len = 64;
> + d.binding = false;
> +
> + return generate_smb3signingkey(sess, &d);
> +}
> +
> +struct derivation_twin {
> + struct derivation encryption;
> + struct derivation decryption;
> +};
> +
> +static int generate_smb3encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
> + const struct derivation_twin *ptwin)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = generate_key(sess, ptwin->encryption.label,
> + ptwin->encryption.context, sess->smb3encryptionkey,
> + SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + rc = generate_key(sess, ptwin->decryption.label,
> + ptwin->decryption.context,
> + sess->smb3decryptionkey, SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "dumping generated AES encryption keys\n");
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Cipher type %d\n", sess->conn->cipher_type);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Session Id %llu\n", sess->id);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Session Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE, sess->sess_key);
> + if (sess->conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_CCM ||
> + sess->conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "ServerIn Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB3_GCM256_CRYPTKEY_SIZE, sess->smb3encryptionkey);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "ServerOut Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB3_GCM256_CRYPTKEY_SIZE, sess->smb3decryptionkey);
> + } else {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "ServerIn Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB3_GCM128_CRYPTKEY_SIZE, sess->smb3encryptionkey);
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "ServerOut Key %*ph\n",
> + SMB3_GCM128_CRYPTKEY_SIZE, sess->smb3decryptionkey);
> + }
> + return rc;
return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb30_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + struct derivation_twin twin;
> + struct derivation *d;
> +
> + d = &twin.encryption;
> + d->label.iov_base = "SMB2AESCCM";
> + d->label.iov_len = 11;
> + d->context.iov_base = "ServerOut";
> + d->context.iov_len = 10;
> +
> + d = &twin.decryption;
> + d->label.iov_base = "SMB2AESCCM";
> + d->label.iov_len = 11;
> + d->context.iov_base = "ServerIn ";
> + d->context.iov_len = 10;
> +
> + return generate_smb3encryptionkey(sess, &twin);
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
> +{
> + struct derivation_twin twin;
> + struct derivation *d;
> +
> + d = &twin.encryption;
> + d->label.iov_base = "SMBS2CCipherKey";
> + d->label.iov_len = 16;
> + d->context.iov_base = sess->Preauth_HashValue;
> + d->context.iov_len = 64;
> +
> + d = &twin.decryption;
> + d->label.iov_base = "SMBC2SCipherKey";
> + d->label.iov_len = 16;
> + d->context.iov_base = sess->Preauth_HashValue;
> + d->context.iov_len = 64;
> +
> + return generate_smb3encryptionkey(sess, &twin);
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *buf,
> + __u8 *pi_hash)
> +{
> + int rc = -1;
int rc = -EINVAL;
> + struct smb2_hdr *rcv_hdr = (struct smb2_hdr *)buf;
> + char *all_bytes_msg = (char *)&rcv_hdr->ProtocolId;
> + int msg_size = be32_to_cpu(rcv_hdr->smb2_buf_length);
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx = NULL;
> +
> + if (conn->preauth_info->Preauth_HashId ==
> + SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_SHA512) {
Flip this condition around:
if (conn->preauth_info->Preauth_HashId !=
SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_SHA512)
return -EINVAL;
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_sha512();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not alloc sha512 rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
Pull this code in a tab.
> + } else {
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_SHA512(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not init shashn");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_SHA512(ctx), pi_hash, 64);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with n\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_SHA512(ctx), all_bytes_msg, msg_size);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with n\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_SHA512(ctx), pi_hash);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate hash err : %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_sd_hash(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *sd_buf, int len,
> + __u8 *pi_hash)
> +{
> + int rc = -1;
int rc = -EINVAL;
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx = NULL;
> +
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_sha256();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not alloc sha256 rc %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_init(CRYPTO_SHA256(ctx));
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not init shashn");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_SHA256(ctx), sd_buf, len);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "could not update with n\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_shash_final(CRYPTO_SHA256(ctx), pi_hash);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not generate hash err : %d\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +out:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int ksmbd_get_encryption_key(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, __u64 ses_id,
> + int enc, u8 *key)
> +{
> + struct ksmbd_session *sess;
> + u8 *ses_enc_key;
> +
> + sess = ksmbd_session_lookup(conn, ses_id);
> + if (!sess)
> + return 1;
Please never return 1 on failure... :/ return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ses_enc_key = enc ? sess->smb3encryptionkey :
> + sess->smb3decryptionkey;
> + memcpy(key, ses_enc_key, SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void smb2_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, const void *buf,
> + unsigned int buflen)
> +{
> + void *addr;
> +
> + if (is_vmalloc_addr(buf))
> + addr = vmalloc_to_page(buf);
> + else
> + addr = virt_to_page(buf);
> + sg_set_page(sg, addr, buflen, offset_in_page(buf));
> +}
> +
> +static struct scatterlist *ksmbd_init_sg(struct kvec *iov, unsigned int nvec,
> + u8 *sign)
> +{
> + struct scatterlist *sg;
> + unsigned int assoc_data_len = sizeof(struct smb2_transform_hdr) - 24;
> + int i, nr_entries[3] = {0}, total_entries = 0, sg_idx = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < nvec - 1; i++) {
If "nvec" is zero this loop will corrupt memory until the system
crashes.
> + unsigned long kaddr = (unsigned long)iov[i + 1].iov_base;
> +
> + if (is_vmalloc_addr(iov[i + 1].iov_base)) {
> + nr_entries[i] = ((kaddr + iov[i + 1].iov_len +
> + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT) -
> + (kaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> + } else {
> + nr_entries[i]++;
> + }
> + total_entries += nr_entries[i];
> + }
> +
> + /* Add two entries for transform header and signature */
> + total_entries += 2;
> +
> + sg = kmalloc_array(total_entries, sizeof(struct scatterlist), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!sg)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + sg_init_table(sg, total_entries);
> + smb2_sg_set_buf(&sg[sg_idx++], iov[0].iov_base + 24, assoc_data_len);
> + for (i = 0; i < nvec - 1; i++) {
> + void *data = iov[i + 1].iov_base;
> + int len = iov[i + 1].iov_len;
> +
> + if (is_vmalloc_addr(data)) {
> + int j, offset = offset_in_page(data);
> +
> + for (j = 0; j < nr_entries[i]; j++) {
> + unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> +
> + if (len <= 0)
> + break;
Can "len" really be negative here? That can't be good at all...
> +
> + if (bytes > len)
> + bytes = len;
> +
> + sg_set_page(&sg[sg_idx++],
> + vmalloc_to_page(data), bytes,
> + offset_in_page(data));
> +
> + data += bytes;
> + len -= bytes;
> + offset = 0;
> + }
> + } else {
> + sg_set_page(&sg[sg_idx++], virt_to_page(data), len,
> + offset_in_page(data));
> + }
> + }
> + smb2_sg_set_buf(&sg[sg_idx], sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
> + return sg;
> +}
> +
> +int ksmbd_crypt_message(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct kvec *iov,
> + unsigned int nvec, int enc)
> +{
> + struct smb2_transform_hdr *tr_hdr =
> + (struct smb2_transform_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
> + unsigned int assoc_data_len = sizeof(struct smb2_transform_hdr) - 24;
> + int rc = 0;
No need.
> + struct scatterlist *sg;
> + u8 sign[SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE] = {};
> + u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE];
> + struct aead_request *req;
> + char *iv;
> + unsigned int iv_len;
> + struct crypto_aead *tfm;
> + unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
> + struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + rc = ksmbd_get_encryption_key(conn,
> + le64_to_cpu(tr_hdr->SessionId),
> + enc,
> + key);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_err("Could not get %scryption key\n", enc ? "en" : "de");
> + return 0;
Please add a comment why this is a return 0.
> + }
> +
> + if (conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM ||
> + conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_gcm();
> + else
> + ctx = ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_ccm();
> + if (!ctx) {
> + ksmbd_err("crypto alloc failed\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM ||
> + conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)
> + tfm = CRYPTO_GCM(ctx);
> + else
> + tfm = CRYPTO_CCM(ctx);
> +
> + if (conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_CCM ||
> + conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)
> + rc = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, SMB3_GCM256_CRYPTKEY_SIZE);
> + else
> + rc = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, SMB3_GCM128_CRYPTKEY_SIZE);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_err("Failed to set aead key %d\n", rc);
> + goto free_ctx;
> + }
> +
> + rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
> + if (rc) {
> + ksmbd_err("Failed to set authsize %d\n", rc);
> + goto free_ctx;
> + }
> +
> + req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!req) {
> + ksmbd_err("Failed to alloc aead request\n");
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_ctx;
> + }
> +
> + if (!enc) {
> + memcpy(sign, &tr_hdr->Signature, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
> + crypt_len += SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
> + }
> +
> + sg = ksmbd_init_sg(iov, nvec, sign);
> + if (!sg) {
> + ksmbd_err("Failed to init sg\n");
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_req;
> + }
> +
> + iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
> + iv = kzalloc(iv_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!iv) {
> + ksmbd_err("Failed to alloc IV\n");
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_sg;
> + }
> +
> + if (conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM ||
> + conn->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM) {
> + memcpy(iv, (char *)tr_hdr->Nonce, SMB3_AES_GCM_NONCE);
> + } else {
> + iv[0] = 3;
> + memcpy(iv + 1, (char *)tr_hdr->Nonce, SMB3_AES_CCM_NONCE);
> + }
> +
> + aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);
> + aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
> + aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
> +
> + if (enc)
> + rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
> + else
> + rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
> + if (!rc && enc)
> + memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
Always do failure handling. Don't do sucess handling. Keep the success
path at indent level one. Don't make the last function call special.
if (enc)
rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
else
rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
if (rc)
goto free_iv;
if (enc)
memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
free_iv:
kfree(iv);
> +
> + kfree(iv);
> +free_sg:
> + kfree(sg);
> +free_req:
> + kfree(req);
> +free_ctx:
> + ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(ctx);
> + return rc;
> +}
> diff --git a/fs/cifsd/auth.h b/fs/cifsd/auth.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..6fcfad5e7e1f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/cifsd/auth.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __AUTH_H__
> +#define __AUTH_H__
> +
> +#include "ntlmssp.h"
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_KERBEROS5
> +#define AUTH_GSS_LENGTH 96
> +#define AUTH_GSS_PADDING 0
> +#else
> +#define AUTH_GSS_LENGTH 74
> +#define AUTH_GSS_PADDING 6
> +#endif
> +
> +#define CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE (16)
> +#define CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE (16)
> +
> +/*
> + * Size of the ntlm client response
> + */
> +#define CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE 24
> +#define CIFS_SMB1_SIGNATURE_SIZE 8
> +#define CIFS_SMB1_SESSKEY_SIZE 16
> +
> +#define KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP 0x0001
> +#define KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5 0x0002
> +#define KSMBD_AUTH_MSKRB5 0x0004
> +#define KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5U2U 0x0008
> +
> +struct ksmbd_session;
> +struct ksmbd_conn;
> +struct kvec;
> +
> +int ksmbd_crypt_message(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
> + struct kvec *iov,
> + unsigned int nvec,
> + int enc);
> +
> +void ksmbd_copy_gss_neg_header(void *buf);
> +
> +int ksmbd_auth_ntlm(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
> + char *pw_buf);
> +
> +int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
> + struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2,
> + int blen,
> + char *domain_name);
> +
> +int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(struct authenticate_message *authblob,
> + int blob_len,
> + struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +
> +int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_neg_blob(struct negotiate_message *negblob,
> + int blob_len,
> + struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +
> +unsigned int
> +ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob,
> + struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +
> +int ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
> + char *in_blob, int in_len,
> + char *out_blob, int *out_len);
> +
> +int ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
> + char *key,
> + struct kvec *iov,
> + int n_vec,
> + char *sig);
> +int ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
> + char *key,
> + struct kvec *iov,
> + int n_vec,
> + char *sig);
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb30_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb311_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb30_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +int ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess);
> +
> +int ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
> + char *buf,
> + __u8 *pi_hash);
> +int ksmbd_gen_sd_hash(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *sd_buf, int len,
> + __u8 *pi_hash);
> +#endif
> diff --git a/fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.c b/fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1830ae1b5ed3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/cifsd/crypto_ctx.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/string.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/wait.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +
> +#include "glob.h"
> +#include "crypto_ctx.h"
> +#include "buffer_pool.h"
> +
> +struct crypto_ctx_list {
> + spinlock_t ctx_lock;
> + int avail_ctx;
> + struct list_head idle_ctx;
> + wait_queue_head_t ctx_wait;
> +};
> +
> +static struct crypto_ctx_list ctx_list;
> +
> +static inline void free_aead(struct crypto_aead *aead)
> +{
> + if (aead)
> + crypto_free_aead(aead);
> +}
> +
> +static void free_shash(struct shash_desc *shash)
> +{
> + if (shash) {
> + crypto_free_shash(shash->tfm);
> + kfree(shash);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static struct crypto_aead *alloc_aead(int id)
> +{
> + struct crypto_aead *tfm = NULL;
> +
> + switch (id) {
> + case CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + default:
> + ksmbd_err("Does not support encrypt ahead(id : %d)\n", id);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> + ksmbd_err("Failed to alloc encrypt aead : %ld\n", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + return tfm;
> +}
> +
> +static struct shash_desc *alloc_shash_desc(int id)
> +{
> + struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
> + struct shash_desc *shash;
> +
> + switch (id) {
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA256:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA512:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha512", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_MD4:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md4", 0, 0);
> + break;
> + case CRYPTO_SHASH_MD5:
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
> + break;
No default path.
> + }
> +
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm))
> + return NULL;
> +
> + shash = kzalloc(sizeof(*shash) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!shash)
> + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> + else
> + shash->tfm = tfm;
> + return shash;
> +}
> +
> +static struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx_alloc(void)
> +{
> + return kzalloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
> +}
Delete this function. Call kzalloc() directly.
> +
> +static void ctx_free(struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx)
regards,
dan carpenter
Powered by blists - more mailing lists